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Abstract
This thesis is based on a collection of three essays which study the effects of financial policy on
labor markets. The first two essays investigate the effects of U.S. bank branching deregulation
on labor markets. The first essay studies how these regulations impacted wages and working
hours of traditional payroll workers. The second essay studies the impact of these policy
reforms on the occupational choice to engage in self-employed work. The main finding
of this set of studies is credit access has real effects on the workforce. Estimates from
the econometric analysis used in this study suggest that credit access that stemmed from
various policy changes lead to increases in entry and exit rates among self-employed workers,
especially among those who started incorporated businesses. Furthermore, these effects are
stronger among groups that typically face tougher credit constraints such as younger workers,
minorities. The results of this study also show that increases in credit, stemming from policy
reforms, lead to increases in the annual working hours and growth rate of the real wage rate
for private sector workers. Further analysis suggests that increases in the annual labor supply
response is higher for workers with lower earning rates, which lead to decreases in income
inequality in the absence of a decline in earnings inequality. The third essay studies the
effects of bankruptcy reforms on self-employed workers classified by their needs for external
finance. We find that after a national tightening of the bankruptcy code, there is a decline in
the rates of entry among unincorporated self-employed workers in states which offer a lower
degree of bankruptcy protection.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
This dissertation consists of three distinct works that lie at the intersection of financial
economics and labor economics. The purpose of this work is to investigate a better under-
standing of how changes in credit constraints stemming from financial policy reforms impact
the workforce and small business entrepreneurship. The first two essays examine the im-
pact of U.S. state-level banking deregulation. The third essay examines how changes in the
personal bankruptcy code, through federal legislation, impacts entrepreneurship.
For much of the 20th century, U.S. laws prohibited or restricted the geographic expansion
of commercial banks. Federal laws gave U.S. states a broad authority to regulate branching
and bank mergers within their border. Advances in technology and finance fundamentally
changed the role of banks in the economy, and thus from the 1970s through the 1990s, states
removed these prohibitions on banking sector. Banking deregulation reduced banking costs
and increased efficiency, which in turn increased local credit supply (Krozner and Strahan
2014).
Chapter 2 of this dissertation exploits the staggered-in-time nature of these policy reforms
to conduct a differences-in-differences analysis. We study the banking deregulation on the
wages and labor input responses of U.S. private sector workers. From 1970s through the
1990s, states elected to remove prohibitions on branching, which resulted in large structural
changes on U.S. financial markets and increased local credit supply. We show that interstate
banking deregulation led to increases in the growth rate of the real hourly wages, annual
labor incomes and annual labor input responses, as measured by annual hours and weeks.
We show that policy reforms lead to declines annual labor income inequality and not wage
rate inequality. These findings suggest that the declines in income inequality due to banking
deregulation came from increases in the quantity of the labor input.
Chapter 3 uses state-level bank branch deregulation to study the impact of changes
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in credit on entrepreneurship at the individual-owner level.1 Self-employed individuals are
classified into incorporated and unincorporated business owners. Exploiting the variation
in the staggered timing of banking deregulation, the analysis yields that branching reforms
affected the entry and exit rates of the incorporated self-employed. Further, the branching
reforms encouraged unincorporated businesses to incorporate. Finally, the effects of reforms
are different across groups based on gender, race, and age. We find stronger effects on
incorporated business creation among minorities, and higher exit rates among the young
and minorities.
In the last chapter, we study how a major change in U.S Bankruptcy policy, the Bankruptcy
Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), affects individual-owner entrepreneur-
ship. This reform reduced the ability of borrowers to file for chapter 7 bankruptcy, a proce-
dure which allows borrowers to default on debts in exchange for assets above an exemption
level. We classify the self-employed into SIC industry categories and match each industry
category with a common measure of external finance. We find that this policy reduced entry
into unincorporated entrepreneurship. This effect is stronger in states which offer the low
home-equity exemptions. Furthermore, in states with high levels of home-stead exemption,
the effect is directly linked to a particular industries need for external finance. This sug-
gests that a reduction in risk sharing between borrowers and lenders, due to the passage of
BAPCA, lead to a lower level of entrepreneurship.
1This chapter mainly draws from a joint paper co-authored with my advisor Prof. Unel (see Sarker and
Unel 2017).
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Chapter 2. Impact of U.S. Bank Expansion on Labor Markets
2.1 Introduction
Through a large part of the twentieth century, U.S national and state-level financial policies
heavily restricted the ability of commercial banks to expand geographically. For example,
prior to 1970 no state allowed a bank chartered in another state to acquire banks or open
branches within its border. Most states prohibited banks chartered within the state to ac-
quire or open new branches. Beginning 1970s through 1990s, many U.S. states elected to lift
policy restrictions prohibiting bank mergers and branching, which had transformative effects
on the U.S financial sector. By the late 1990s, the banking sector had heavily integrated
with 35.5 percent of the nation’s assets held by the eight largest banks, and the number of
distinct banking organizations fell by 30 percent from 1988 to 1997 (Berger et al. 1999).
Since these reforms constitute a major episode of financial liberalization, a large body
of research has been carried out to study their impact on economic activity. A number
of studies have documented that banking deregulation affected the availability of credit by
increasing competition and improving efficiency from integration (Stiroh and Strahan 2003,
Jayaratne and Strahan 1998). Consequently, banking reforms led to increases in local credit
supply (Strahan 2003) and improvements in the allocation of credit (Dick and Lehnart 2010).
In this chapter, we study the effects of a positive financial shock on the labor market.
Specifically, using U.S. census data, we exploit the time variation from the staggered nature
of these policy changes to explore the causal impact of deregulation on hourly wage rates,
real incomes and labor input responses of U.S. private sector wage and salary workers over
the period 1976–2006. First, we provide evidence that banking reforms lead to an increase in
the growth rate of real hourly wages and annual labor incomes. we show that these increases
stem from workers who are in the top and the middle of the wage distribution. Second, we
provide estimates that suggest deregulation lead to a robust decline in annual labor income
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inequality, but not in wage rate inequality.
Third, we show that this reduction in labor income inequality stems from the time that
workers spend working. we find that interstate banking deregulation has led to an increase
in the average number of hours individuals worked. Estimates suggest that workers worked
an average of 25 hours longer per year in states where interstate banking reforms have been
instituted, and this increase mainly stems from the increase in the average number of weeks
worked. We show that the additional hours worked is concentrated among those who are in
the bottom and middle earning quartiles.
The availability of credit is rarely an exogenous event, as it is affected by many confound-
ing factors such individual borrower characteristics, past and future macroeconomic states,
monetary policy, asset prices and beliefs. Furthermore, these factors are also influenced
by the availability of credit, which introduces reverse causality problems. For this reason
researchers often employ economic models with strong structural assumptions in order to
understand the economic effects credit shocks. Because banking reforms were instituted in
different states at different times, which are determined by political climate and lobbying
activities of big banks (Krozner and Strahan 2014), these policy changes are often used to
empirically assess the causal impact of a change in credit on the real economy.
The main advantage of the design used in this chapter is that the timing of banking
deregulation is unlikely to be related to individual level characteristics that influence wealth,
credit worthiness and earnings. However, this does not circumvent that other macroeconomic
factors could influence the timing of deregulation. In order to address this issue, we conduct
event studies in order to understand the dynamics before and after deregulation. In the
cases where potential existing trends can explain the timing of deregulation, we present
two estimates: one estimate that presumes the trend would have continued in the absence
of banking deregulation, and one which assumes there are no trends once state-specific
trends are controlled for. This creates a plausible boundary for the true casual impact of
deregulation. In this manner, the analysis here identifies the causal impact of deregulation,
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while making only a limited number of structural assumptions.
This chapter contributes to a large and growing literature that has investigated the impact
of U.S. bank deregulations on various economic outcomes such as growth and productivity
(Jayarante and Strahan 1996, Jerzmanowski 2017), entrepreneurship (Black and Strahan
2002, Kerr and Nanda 2009, Sarker and Unel 2017), economic volatility (Morgan et al. 2004,
Krishnamurthy 2013), inequality (Black and Strahan 2001, Beck et al. 2010), mortgage loans
and homeownership (Tewari 2014), labor’s share of income (Leblebicioglu and Weinberger
2018), among many others. Full coverage of this literature is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Our paper relates closely to Beck et al. (2010) and Dao and Ume (2016), who investigate
the impact of deregulation on different aspects of labor markets.
Beck et al. (2010) show that banking deregulation reduced income inequality by increas-
ing incomes in the lower part of the income distribution while having negligible impact on
incomes above the median. This chapter complements theirs in two key aspects. First, we
focus on how deregulation affected the labor input and wage rates (rather than annual total
income) across different wage groups. Second, our analysis suggests that banking deregula-
tion may have caused a decline in income inequality through an increase in the quantity of
the labor input supplied by workers in lower earnings groups, rather than declines in hourly
wage inequality.
Bui and Ume (2016) find that workers report a small decline in the number of weekly
hours they worked after the introduction of intrastate deregulation. This effect is driven
predominantly by lower-middle income workers. These authors focus on the labor input
response of hours worked one week prior to the census survey. we consider a broader set of
labor input measures (e.g., weeks and usual hours worked last year). In addition, our analysis
predominantly focuses the effects of deregulation on the growth of hourly wage rates, and
incomes. Finally, we examine the effects of both intrastate and interstate reforms, while they
only consider intrastate reforms. we find that when both reforms are considered, interstate
banking reforms rather than intrastate reforms drive labor input responses.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides further back-
ground on banking deregulation in the US. Section 2.3 describes the data and its construction.
Section 2.4 describes the details of the econometric methodology of this study. Section 2.5
presents the results. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Background on Banking Deregulations
Until early 1970s, the creation and expansion of commercial banks were heavily restricted in
the U.S. The McFadden Act, which was passed in 1927, gave states the ability to regulate
creation of bank branches within their state borders. The Bank Holding Act of 1956 barred
bank holding companies from acquiring banks across state lines unless the target state had
a law explicitly allowing interstate acquisitions. Bank expansions largely occurred through
multi-bank holding companies (MBHC) which operated individual commercial bank branches
as separate institutions. Strong branching regulations were maintained in part because they
led to the creation of local bank monopolies who lobbied to maintain restrictions. Further-
more, monopolistic banking charters were an important source of tax revenue (Kroszner and
Strahan, 1999). In the 1970s, the introduction of technologies such as the ATM, as well as
the creation of chequable money market funds lead to a decline in the relative importance
of relationship lending among banks. Expansion minded banks and special interest groups
lobbied for the removal of banking restrictions (Krozner and Strahan 2014). Deregulation
involved three types of reforms. The first reform allowed multi-bank holding companies
(MHBC) chartered in a state to merge or acquire existing branches. MHBCs could consoli-
date their existing branches into a single network and purchase branches from other MHBCs.
The second type of reform, allowed ’De novo’ branching, which allowed MHBCs to open new
branches within their charter state. The third reform allowed out of state banks to purchase
branches within a states borders.
Prior to 1980, the only state to allow interstate banking was Maine. By 1993, every state
except Hawaii allowed some degree of interstate banking. In 1994 the U.S federal govern-
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ment passed Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA). This
legislation eliminated the Douglas Amendment from the Bankholding Act of 1956 and the
Mcfadden Act, and allowed well capitalized banks to acquire branches in any U.S. state. In
most states ‘de novo’ branching deregulation was implemented soon after, or simultaneously
branching by M&A was also allowed, and thus it is hard to estimate the impact of these
two deregulations separately. Following other researchers, we use the year a state allowed
branching by M&A.
As discussed in the previous section, branching deregulation led to profound structural
changes in the banking sector. Banking deregulation led to a rapid period of bank consol-
idation, with a larger share of assets being held by larger multi-state banks. Despite this
rapid consolidation of the banking sector, deregulation decreased local market concentra-
tions through a rapid expansion of new bank branches. Deregulation allowed new banks to
open branches in previously restricted markets as well (Strahan, 2003). Branch deregulation
increased efficiency in the banking sector by reducing costs and increasing the market share
of more efficient banks (Stiroh and Strahan, 2003). Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) have found
that non-interest costs such as salaries and loan losses fell after deregulation.
Deregulation of branch expansion increased the availability of credit. The period following
the deregulation of both intrastate and interstate mergers saw increases in loan origination,
credit cards, chapter 7 personal bankruptcies, and a reduction in bank charge-offs (Dick
and Lehnert, 2010). Furthermore, empirical studies such as Tewari (2014) and Favara and
Imbs (2015) show, by exploiting the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act which requires that
financial institutions make mortgage data public, that increased lending occurred solely in
commercial banks affected by deregulation. Favara and Imbs further show that the degree
to which states deregulated interstate banking after the passage of the IBBEA, expanded
the availability of the number of mortgage loans, dollar amounts of mortgage lending and
value of mortgages.
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2.3 Data
The main source of labor market data comes from the March Current Population Surveys
(CPS) from 1977 to 2007 (covering earnings from 1976 to 2006). Each CPS file provides
annual estimates based on a survey of more than 60,000 households. We use the data
complied by Flood et al. (2018), which are publicly available at Integrated Public Use
Micro Samples (IPUMS) website. The sample is a repeated cross section, and does not trace
household over time. Each observation is assigned a probability weight reflecting how closely
it represents households within the population. We use these sampling weights throughout all
of our analysis. The survey contains a broad range of information about income, occupation,
industry, employment, education and demographics. For this analysis, we use variables which
report information about income and time spent working in the year prior to the survey date.
For the primary analysis, we consider only employed private sector workers between the ages
of 18 and 64. We exclude both the self-employed and the public sector workers.
The variables used from these surveys are total number of weeks worked, usual number of
hours worked per week, annual earnings from wages and salaries. Our analysis excludes all
observations with missing and allocated values. In constructing wage series, we also correct
top-coded earners following Autor et al. (2008) and Unel (2010). We adjust earnings for
inflation by using the Personal Consumption Index (PCE) from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA). The real hourly wage rate for a given year is calculated as the total income
from wage and salaries divided by total annual hours worked. We drop from the sample
workers with hourly earnings considerably below the real minimum wage.
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics about the CPS-March, 1976–2007
Private Sector All Full-time Prime
Workers, 18-64 Age Workers
1 2
Age 37.3 38.2
Male (%) . 52.9 52.7
Female (%) 47.1 47.3
White (%) 86.9 85.7
Black (%) 8.2 9.0
College Graduate (%) 22.3 28.5
Manufacturing (%) 22.5 21.5
Retail and Services (%) 39.1 41.3
Observations 1,437,324 1,445,579
Notes: Column 1 presents summary statistics about primary sample; Private sector U.S. workers between
ages 18 and 64. Public sector and Self-employed are excluded. Column 2 presents summary statistic on
appendix sample. Sample consists of public sector and private sector workers between the ages of 25 and 54,
who worked at least 35 hours a week and 40 weeks a year.
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics about key variables for wage and salary workers.
Column 1 reports information about the primary sample used in this status, the employed
private sector workers. It contains about 1.5 million observations. The average age is 37, and
males constitute about 53 percent of the sample. Around 86 percent of the sample are white
and 20 percent are college educated. Column 2 reports summary statistics about prime-aged
workers. A major difference between the two samples is that a considerably larger group of
the prime-aged workers is college educated, reflecting that prime aged sample is concentrated
among workers who are above the traditional college age.
Information on Banking Deregulation is taken from Amel (2008). As noted by Strahan
and Black (2002), banking activities in Delaware and South Dakota are skewed by the
presence of credit card banks. Therefore, our analysis covers 48 states over the 1976-2006
period.
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2.4 Econometric Model
This study uses a difference-in-differences (DD) framework to examine the effects of intrastate
branching and interstate banking on the labor market. We make use of the fact that states
deregulated banking at different times in order to estimate the impact of banking policies
on labor market variables. The main specification used in this study is
Yist = αIntrast + βInterst + γXist + ηs + ηt + ηst+ εist, (2.1)
where Intrast (Interst) are dummy variables which identify if intrastate (interstate) banking
deregulation is in effect in state s and year t. Each dummy variable equals zero up to the
year of deregulation and one afterward. The main coefficients of interest are α and β, which
denote the marginal impact of these two types of deregulation. The dependent variable Yist
for an individual i working in state s in year t could be:
• the log of real hourly earnings from employment
• the log of weekly earnings from employment
• the log of real annual earnings from employment
• reported number of weeks spent working over an year.
• usual number of hours per week spent working at all jobs
• total annual hours
In most specifications, We include Xist, a vector of individual level controls for race (black
and other dummies), gender, age and age square.1 The variable ηs denotes state fixed effects
to control for any state-specific factors. Year fixed effects are included via ηt to control for
1We do not include variables such as unemployment rate, corporate tax rate, real personal income,
growth rate of gross state product, education and experience etc. in our controls. These are potential
outcome variables, and thus considered bad controls (Angrist and Pischke 2009). However, including them
in our specification does not have a significant impact on our estimates (results are available upon request).
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common macroeconomic shocks. State-specific time trends (ηst) are included to account for
other trending factors. All regressions are weighted by the CPS individual-level weights.
Regressions use heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the state-level.
A key identification assumption of the DD research design is an assumption of no pre-
treatment trends. In this study, we include state-specific time trends in order to control for
this problem. However, we also conduct the following dynamic analysis that allows us to
understand the impact of deregulation over time,
Yist =
10∑
τ=−10
ατ Intra
τ
st +
10∑
τ=−10
βτ Inter
τ
st + γXist + ηs + ηt + εist, (2.2)
where we extend the main regression equation to include a set of twenty dummies for each
type of deregulation. Each dummy takes a value of one the τth year before or after dereg-
ulation, and is zero otherwise. The end points take a value of one for all earlier and later
years. We exclude the year of deregulation. This allows us to explore the dynamic effects
of deregulation and provides a check of ‘Granger’ causality to see if the dependent variable
predicts deregulation. Here, if ατ and βτ are not statistically different from zero for τ < 0,
then the likelihood that pre-treatment trends are present is reduced.
2.5 Results
This section reports the results of the empirical exercises. The effects of intrastate and inter-
state banking deregulation on the wages are discussed in Section 5.1. The next subsection
investigates the impact of deregulation on wage inequality. Finally, how banking reforms
have affected labor input (measured by the number of weeks worked, usual weekly hours,
and total annual hours) is discussed in Section 5.3.
2.5.1 Effects of Bank Deregulation on Wages
We first present results obtained from event studies to see whether there are any pre-
treatment effects. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the plots of the lag and lead coefficients estimates
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from equation (2.2) and their corresponding confidence interval, which allows us to visualize
the dynamic effects on the policy on the log of hourly wages. Each point on the dotted line
depicts the coefficient estimate and the vertical lines show the corresponding 95% confidence
interval. The dashed line represents a counter-factual line which is fitted to the points prior
to the policy change, this provides a visual interpretation for the impact of the policy change.
The counter-factual line represents the change in the outcome variable, if the pre-treatment
trend were to continue.
Figure 2.1, which corresponds to intrastate deregulation, shows a gradual decline in the
growth of real wages in the years prior to deregulation, but none of these coefficients is
statistically significant. However, the pattern of the data does not fully reject the possibility
that states which were experiencing a fall in earnings growth deregulated the banking sector
anticipating better growth prospects. This is often referred to in the labor literature as
an Ashenfelter dip, a common problem in program evaluation studies.2 Notice that the
coefficients after intrastate deregulation are also not statistically significant, and that the
counter-factual line runs through the confidence interval for at 5 years after deregulation.
This suggests that intrastate deregulation did not have much of an effect on the wage rate.
While the counter-factual suggests that intrastate deregulation may have caused wages to
rise 5 years after the policy implemented, by this point most states had deregulate interstate
deregulation which makes it hard to conclude that this effect is the result of intrastate
branching policies.
Figure 2.2, corresponds to interstate deregulation, the pattern is similar to the previous
figure. The coefficients prior to deregulation are mostly insignificant statistically, however
there exists a negative pattern in the data. This suggests that on average the growth rate
of wages is falling prior to deregulation and has become negative prior to the policy change,
in a potentially confounding manner. If one considers the pre-treatment estimates to not
2The classic example of a Ashenfelter’s dip comes from difficulties in evaluating the effects job training
problems. Workers entering into a jobs training program experience a dip in earnings prior to starting
program. This introduces a self-selection bias, as the dip in earnings may be their reason for entering the
program. This undermines an assumption of random assignment.
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Figure 2.1: Change in Log Wages,Years Before or After Intrastate Bank Deregulation
Figure 2.2: Change in Log Wages,Years Before or After Interstate Bank Deregulation
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be statistically different from 0 this suggests that banking deregulation caused a persistent
negative decline in the wages. However, the counter-factual line, which plots the scenario
where pre-existing trend continues, suggests that banking deregulation had a positive impact
on the growth of real wages.
In order to account for the potential trending factors in figures 2.1 and 2.2, we in-
clude state-specific time-trends into the main differences-in-differences (DD) specification
presented in equation (2.1), which is often used to control for mild trending factors. We
also consider a second specification which exploits the approximately linear nature of the
pre-treatment trend. The key idea is to compare the slopes between the pre and post-trends.
This requires making an assumption that pre-treatment trend would continue in the post-
period in the absence of the policy change. The framework is similar to the approach in
Willage (2018) who uses changes in health insurance rates stemming from the affordable
health care act to study ex-ante moral hazard.
We extend equation (2.1) in the following fashion:
Yist =α1Inter-Trendst + β1Intrast + β2Intra Post-trendst+
δ1Interst + δ2Inter Post-trendst + γXist + ηs + ηt + εist,
(2.3)
where Inter-Trendst accounts for the counter-factual trend. It takes the value of the number of
years before or after a state deregulated, where the before values are negative. Note that the
variable is also equal to the difference between the observation year and the year of deregula-
tion, thus specification does not admit for state specific time trends. The Inter Post-trendst
(Intra Post-trendst) variable is the number of years after interstate (intrastate) deregulation
and 0 for all years prior to the deregulation. The other variables are defined as in equation
(2.1). Here, our parameters of interest are δ1, δ2. Where δ1 corresponds to the immediate
impact from interstate deregulation and δ2 corresponds to the trend.
Notice that the standard DD model is equivalent to equation (2.3) if α, β2 , and δ2 are
set equal to zero. This implies that the standard DD model is a special case of this model
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Table 2.2 Impact of Deregulation on Log of Hourly Earnings, 1976–2006
DD DD Slope DD Slope DD Slope
1 2 3 4
Intra −0.0058 0.0054 0.0047
(0.0104) (0.0140) (0.0122)
Inter 0.0106 0.0031 0.0027
(0.0077) (0.00950) (0.0098)
Intra Trend 0.0031∗∗ −0.0045∗
(0.0015) (0.0026)
Intra Post-Trend .00373∗ 0.0012
(0.0019) (0.0019)
Inter Trend −0.0039
(0.0024)
Inter Post-Trend 0.0142∗∗∗ 0.0134∗∗∗
(0.0036) (0.0041)
Time Trends Yes No No No
Observations 1,437,324 1,437,324 1,437,324 1,437,324
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the state level, and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Controls are not reported for
brevity.
where the slope of pre-treatment trends are zero and there is no time-varying treatment
effect. The estimated effect of deregulation from derived from equation (2.1) and equation
(2.3) are the impact of the policy change for the two different scenarios presented in figure
2.2. One which presumes that treatment effects are not statistically different from zero, the
other which presumes the linear trend in the figures are present.
Table 2.2 reports the impact of banking policy reforms on log hourly real wages based
on the standard DD model specified in equation (2.1) and the slope change specification in
equation (2.3). Through out this chapter, all regressions include controls, state and year
fixed effects and use sampling weights. For brevity, we do not report the impact of controls.
Column 1 presents estimates from equation (2.1) and includes state-specific time trends. The
estimates are not statistically significant, indicating neither intrastate or interstate caused
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a growth in the real wage rate. However, it is worth noting that the value of the coefficient
from interstate banking is positive and much larger than the effect of intrastate. In column 2,
we present a slope change model using intrastate deregulation as the treatment variable. The
estimate associated with the intrastate dummy is not statistically significant, and suggests
that there is no immediate effect from the passage of intrastate deregulation. The estimate
associated with the post-trend (in row 4) suggests that there may have been a small impact
on wage growth over time, but this is only significant at the 10% level. Consistent with the
first figure, there seems to be no real change in the wage rate due to intrastate deregulation.
Column 3 presents the estimates of equation (2.3) when considering interstate reforms.
The estimates suggest there is no immediate impact from interstate banking on the log of
the wage rate, however there is a statistically significant increase on the growth of the wage
rate over time due to reforms. Column 4 presents estimates from a specification of equation
(2.3) that considers both possible policies. Note that the specification only allows for the
correction of either a intrastate policy trend or an interstate policy trend, but not both.
However, this does not effect the core result, which is consistent with columns 2 and 3,
intrastate reforms had no real impact on hourly wages, while interstate reforms lead to an
increase in the growth of real wages over time. The findings in this table suggest that if
banking deregulation had any effect on hourly wages it is positive.
Table 2.3 reports the effects of deregulation on the log of weekly wages and log of annual
wages. We have not presented event study figures for these two variables, their dynamics
behave similarly to the effect of deregulation on the hourly wages depicted in figures 2.1 and
2.2. Column 1 shows the estimates from the standard DD model, the findings suggests that
interstate banking lead to a 3.5 % increase in annual earnings, the finding is statistically
significant at the 5% level. These estimates are consistent with column 2, which presents
the estimates from equation (2.3). Here we see that both deregulation lead to increases
the growth of annual wages over time, though the effects are smaller and not as significant
for intrastate deregulation. When considering log of weekly wages, the standard DD model
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Table 2.3 Impact of Deregulation on Log of Annual and Weekly Earnings, 1976–2006
Log Annual Wages Log Weekly Wages
DD DD Slope DD DD Slope
Variable 1 2 3 4
Intra −0.0047 −0.0013 −0.0050 −0.0021
(0.0155) (0.0142) (0.0114) (0.0089)
Inter 0.0355∗∗ 0.0193 0.0163∗ 0.0011
(0.0134) (0.0144) (0.0082) (0.00891)
Inter Trend −0.0060∗ −0.0093∗∗∗
(0.00348) (0.00233)
Intra Post-Trend 0.0056∗∗ 0.0043∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0017)
Inter Post-Trend 0.0224∗∗∗ 0.0216∗∗∗
(0.0052) (0.0037)
Time Trends Yes No Yes No
Observations 1,437,324 1,437,324 1,385,148 1,385,148
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the state level, and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Controls are not reported for
brevity.
estimates (column 3) shows a positive impact from interstate deregulation. However, this is
only significant at the 10% level. In column 4 estimates from the slope change model shows
an increase in the growth of weekly earnings over time.
Table 2.4 presents estimates of equation (2.3) on the log of hourly earnings across different
earnings groups. We divide the sample observations into each of the following hourly earnings
groups: the bottom quartile, the middle 25%–75%, and the top quartiles. Regressions
reported here include controls, state fixed effects and an interstate banking time-trend. The
estimates show that the interstate banking deregulation had an impact on the growthof
hourly earnings, predominantly for workers which are in the top and the middle of the
income distribution. For brevity, we do not report the results from equation (2.1), however,
the finding is consistent with Table 2.2. DD estimates are positive across all income groups,
but not statistically significant.
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Table 2.4 Impact of Deregulation on Log of Hourly Earnings, by Quartile
Bottom Middle Top
Quartile 25th - 75th Quartile
Variable 1 2 3
Inter Trend −0.0003 −0.0041 0.0004
(0.0027) (0.0031) (.0025)
Intra 0.0151 0.0092 −0.0061
(0.0142) (0.015) (0.0097)
Inter 0.0076 −0.0036 −0.0090
(0.0123) (0.0119) (0.0078)
Intra Post-Trend −0.0021 0.00038 0.0029
(0.0019) (0.00220) (0.0020)
Inter Post-Trend 0.0083∗ 0.0154∗∗∗ 0.0135∗∗∗
(0.0043) (0.0049) (0.0039)
Observations 354,756 709,257 354,867
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the state level, and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Controls are not reported for
brevity.
2.5.2 Bank Deregulation and Wage Inequality
In this section we assess the impact of banking deregulation on income and wage inequality.
We analyze the effects of deregulation on the difference between the natural log of earnings
for those who are high earners and for those who are low-earners. For every year in the
sample we calculate the incomes in each state which are at the 10th, 25th, 75th and 90th
percentile. We then calculate earning ratios for the 75th percentile to the 25th percentile
(75-25 ratio) and 90th percentile to the 10th percentile (90-10 ratio) separately for hourly
wages or incomes. We then estimate equation (2.1) using the natural logs of these variables
as the response variable. The results of this exercise is reported in Table 2.5.
Columns 1 and 2 report the effects of deregulation on income inequality and show that
income inequality fell after deregulation. This finding is only statistically significant for
interstate banking, suggesting that most of decline in income inequality are a result of
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Table 2.5 Impact of Deregulation on Income and Wage Inequality, 1976–2006
Income Wage
Log 90/10 Log 75/25 Log 90/10 Log 75/25
Variable 1 2 3 4
Intra 0.0129 −0.0062 0.0125 0.0001
(0.0229) (0.0143) (0.0093) (0.00715)
Inter −0.0511∗∗ −0.0426∗∗∗ −0.0169∗ −0.0117
(0.0208) (0.0119) (0.0098) (0.00909)
Observations 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488
Notes: All regressions include controls, state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends.
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the state level, and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Controls are not reported for brevity.
interstate banking reforms and not intrastate reforms. Column 3 and Column 4 report the
effects of deregulation on wage inequality. Column 3 suggests that interstate deregulation
may have led to a small decline in wage inequality, but the estimate is statistically significant
at the 10% level. Column 4, reports findings for the log of 75-25 ratio of wages, and the
effects are not significant for either intrastate or interstate reforms.
The exercises here is similar to Beck, Levine and Levkov (2010), who show that intrastate
banking deregulation lead to tightening of the overall income distribution.3 However, as we
will show in the next section, our analysis suggests that this tightening of the distribution
did not come from declines in wage inequality and are partially driven by increases in the
amount of time spent working.
2.5.3 Effects on Time Spent working
We first present results obtained from event studies to see whether there are any pre-
treatment effects. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show plots of the lag and lead coefficients’ estimates
from equation (2.2) and their 95% confidence interval, which allows me to visualize the dy-
namic impact of deregulation on the number of weeks worked. Notice that Figure 2.3, which
3Beck, Levine and Levkov (2010) analyzes the effects of deregulation on a number of different measures of
inequality including state Gini Coefficients, Theil Index and the natural Log Income Percentile Differences.
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Figure 2.3: Change in Weeks, Years Before or After Intrastate Bank Deregulation
relates to intrastate reforms, shows a generally noisy pattern prior to deregulation, which
rejects the likelihood of strong pre-treatment trends. Notice also that the post deregulation
coefficients are not statistically different from 0. The dashed line represents a counter-factual
line which is fitted to the points prior to the policy change, this provides a visual interpreta-
tion for the impact of the policy change. The counter-factual reference line, which is fitted
to the pre-treatment estimate, runs through the post-treatment confidence interval. This
supports the conclusion that intrastate reforms did not have an impact on the number of
weeks individuals spent working.
In Figure 2.4, the coefficients prior to interstate deregulation are associated with lower
number of working weeks, however they are mostly statistically insignificant. Although the
pattern of the data is generally flat, it does not fully reject the possibility of pre-treatment
trends. For this reason, we incorporate state-specific time trends in all regression estimates
based on equation (2.1). The counter-factual reference line runs below the confidence interval
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Figure 2.4: Change in Weeks, Years Before or After Interstate Bank Deregulation
of coefficient estimates after treatment. This suggests that there is an increase in the number
of weeks individuals worked, as seen from a gradual upward trend, suggesting that these
effects were ongoing and persistent following deregulation.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show plots of the coefficient estimates and their respective confidence
intervals from equation (2.2) for total annual hours worked. The pattern is similar to the total
number of working weeks. The coefficient estimates for intrastate reforms are insignificant
and noisy, indicating the policy reform had little effect on hours people worked. Similar to
figure 2.3, the post treatment effects are not statistically different from 0 and the counter-
factual line runs through their confidence interval. Suggesting that intra-state reforms did
not much effect annual hours individual’s worked.
In Figure 2.6, which corresponds to interstate deregulation, post deregulation coefficients
suggest that there is a gradual persistent increase in the number of hours prior to deregu-
lation. Most of the coefficients prior to deregulation are not significant, but their exists an
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Figure 2.5: Change in Hours, Years Before or After Intrastate Bank Deregulation
Ashenfelters Dip. However, the counter factual reference line would run below the confidence
interval, if one fits it to points prior to the dip. This suggests an increase in the total hours
worked, though the standard DD model may not fully capture this effect.
Table 2.6 presents estimates from equation (2.1) of the number of weeks worked over the
course of a year for each of the following earnings groups: the bottom quartile, the middle
25% - 75%, and the top quartiles. The regressions reported include all fixed effects, state-
specific time trends, and other controls X specified in equation (2.1). Column (1) shows that
interstate banking reforms had a positive and statistically significant impact on the number
of weeks worked. The point estimate (.315) is economically meaningful as it suggests that
the average worker spent approximately 1.5 more days working each year. Columns 2–4
report the estimates for the bottom quartile, the middle 25% - 75%, and the top quartile,
respectively. Column (3) suggests that the reforms mainly impacted workers in the middle
earnings group, as the effects are only statistically significant for this group. The effect of
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Figure 2.6: Change in Hours, Years Before or After Interstate Bank Deregulation
intrastate banking is statistically insignificant for all groups.
Table 2.7 reports the effects of deregulation on the number of usual weekly hours worked
for different earning groups. The findings are similar to the effects of reforms on the number
of weeks worked. Interstate banking reforms shows a statistically significant effect on weekly
hours, while the estimates are insignificant for intrastate reforms. Furthermore, columns 2
and 3 show that the effect is driven by workers who lie in the bottom and middle of the wage
distribution, and not the top quartile. Note that the estimate is almost 40% larger for the
bottom of the income (column 2) distribution than those on the middle quartile (column 3).
The effects of deregulation on total hours worked annually is reported in Table 2.8.
The total number of hours is constructed by taking the average number of hours worked
per week and multiplying it by the number of weeks, the effects are consistent with previous
estimates. The exercise here provides a concrete magnitude for the impact of banking reforms
on individual labor input. The finding suggests that after interstate banking reforms were
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Table 2.6 Impact of Deregulation on Weeks Worked, by Earnings Group
All Bottom Middle Top
Quartile 25th - 75th Quartile
Variable 1 2 3 4
Intra 0.0593 −0.0366 0.0832 0.1215
(0.1370) (0.2062) (0.1402) (0.1604)
Inter 0.3142∗∗ 0.4431 0.3723∗∗∗ 0.1496
(0.1448) (0.2823) (0.1206) (0.1916)
Observations 1,437,324 354,756 709,257 354,867
Table 2.7 Impact of Deregulation on Usual Weekly Hours, by Earnings Group
All Bottom Middle Top
Quartile 25th - 75th Quartile
Variable 1 2 3 4
Intra −0.0527 −0.0030 0.0686 −0.1263
(0.1330) (0.2011) (0.1192) (0.1141)
Inter 0.3911∗∗∗ 0.4016∗∗∗ 0.2917∗∗∗ 0.1737
(0.0963) (0.1452) (0.0922) (0.1129)
Observations 1,437,324 354,756 709,257 354,867
passed workers increased the annual quantity of labor input by 25 hours. The effect is
driven by the bottom and middle earning groups of the wage distribution, and workers in
the bottom quartile of the distribution show an average increase approximately 22% higher
than those who are at the middle of the distribution (33.6 hours vs 27.5 hours). Note that
the estimates reported in column 4 indicate that deregulation had no impact on workers in
the top earnings group.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter investigates how changes in credit markets effects the labor market, through
the lens of a major change in U.S. financial policy. We assess the impact of state-level
banking reforms, which are generally thought to increase the availability of credit, on a
nationally representative sample of U.S. workers. The evidence presented here suggests that
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Table 2.8 Impact of Deregulation on Annual Hours, by Earnings Group
All Bottom Middle Top
Quartile 25th - 75th Quartile
Variable 1 2 3 4
Intra 4.097 1.394 7.253 0.341
(8.588) (13.162) (9.345) (9.483)
Inter 24.611∗∗∗ 33.622∗∗ 27.547∗∗∗ 12.133
(7.471) (14.890) (7.387) (8.747)
Observations 1,437,324 354,756 709,257 354,867
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the state level, and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Controls are not reported for
brevity.
interstate banking, which allowed banks to enter into new markets by acquiring branches
across state borders, lead to a growth in real wages and had at the least non-negative
impact on overall wages. The results here show that there does not appear to be any
strong relationship between deregulation and wage inequality, in spite of generally robust
findings that deregulation lead to declines in income inequality as shown in (Beck, Levine and
Levkov, 2009). This suggests that banking deregulation lead to declines income inequality
due to increase in the labor input supplied by workers who are in lower earnings groups.
This is supported by the finding that interstate deregulation lead to increases in the time
individuals reported working among workers who are not within the top earnings quartile
and point estimates suggests that this response is highest for those who are the lowest on
the earnings quartile.
This chapter has also suggested that interstate deregulation has larger macroeconomic
consequences for the labor markets than intrastate banking reforms. This finding is consis-
tent with other studies which consider the effects of deregulation on comprehensive samples
on pay-roll firms. Ceterolli and Strahan (2006) , Kerr and Nanda (2009) find that predom-
inantly interstate banking deregulations rather than intrastate deregulations effect pay-roll
firms, mainly benefited firms with smaller establishment sizes. This is also consistent with
Leblebiciolu and Weinberger (2017) who find interstate reforms lead to decline in labors
25
share of income.
We note that there are limitations to the results presented by the analysis in this chapter.
The presence of potential confounding pre-treatment trends makes it difficult to identify pre-
cise magnitudes for the causal impact of deregulation on wages and labor input. This study
approaches this issue by modeling the potential pre-treatment trend and then comparing it
to estimates which presumes few pre-treatment trends. This creates a plausible boundary
for the true casual effect, which the results suggest is either non-negative or positive. Empir-
ically identifying impact of credit shocks is generally difficult, as the availability of credit is
rarely exogenous. It is affected by current and future macroeconomic states, policy, beliefs
and underlying performance of assets in credit markets. The approach used in this study is
largely one which aims to identify the causal impact of the shock making the fewest possible
structural assumptions.
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Chapter 3. The Impact of Bank Expansion on Self-Employed
Business Owners: Evidence from US States
3.1 Introduction
Entrepreneurship has long been considered a key determinant of growth and economic pros-
perity through its effects on technological progress, market competition, and job creation.
Recent empirical studies show that growth in labor productivity can be often attributed to re-
placement of lower productivity firms by higher productivity entrants.1 They also document
that expansions of start-ups are major sources of gross job creation in the US. Because of its
importance to other economic activities, understanding the determinants of entrepreneurship
has been a subject of considerable interest for economists and policy makers alike.
Many scholars have argued that the limited access to credit is one of the major factors
behind the low level of entrepreneurship in many economies (Buera et al. 2015). According
to the Small Business Credit Survey (2015), nearly 40 percent of respondents said that they
sought credit primarily to expand their business. The majority of small firms (under $1
million in annual revenues) and startups (under 5 years in business) were unable to obtain
any credit. In another survey, conducted by the World Bank (2015), a significant fraction of
business owners (especially those in developing countries) chose credit constraints as the main
obstacle for expanding their production.2 In the light of these surveys, one can reasonably
conclude that individuals wishing to create their own businesses are more likely to face
tougher credit constraints.
In this chapter, we study the causal impact of changes in credit availability due to US
1Important contributions are Foster et al. (2006), Haltiwanger et al. (2013), Fairlie (2014) among many
others. Decker et al. (2014) provides a comprehensive review of the role of entrepreneurship in US job
creation and economic dynamism.
2Small Business Credit Survey is conducted by the Federal Reserve Banks of New York, Atlanta, Cleve-
land, and Philadelphia, and available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/smallbusiness/Spring2014/index.html.
The World Bank’s (2015) entrepreneurship survey can be found at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/
reports.aspx?source=enterprise-surveys#.
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banking deregulation on individual entrepreneurship over the 1980–2007 period. We exploit
the variation in the timing of intrastate and interstate banking deregulation to study the
effects of the resulting credit change. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a main advan-
tage of our approach is that the timing of branching deregulation are unlikely to be related
to factors such as wealth, education, attitudes to risk; as a result, these regulatory changes
provide a natural setting for identifying the causal effects of credit constraints on an individ-
ual’s decision to become an entrepreneur. Using the Current Population Survey Outgoing
Rotation Group (CPS-ORG) files, we consider self-employed individuals (overwhelmingly
small business owners), and classify them into incorporated and unincorporated. Our analy-
sis distinguishes between the incorporated self-employed and unincorporated individuals, as
key differences between these two groups were highlighted in a recent study by Levine and
Rubinstein (2017).3
Using this classification, we identify business creation and closure at individual-owner
level exploiting the rotating nature of the CPS data. We also identify newly incorporated self-
employed individuals who were previously unincorporated, which allows us to study whether
changes in credit encourage the unincorporated to become incorporated.4 An advantage of
our data is that we are also able to explore heterogeneity across individuals as several studies
have found discrimination in credit markets based on gender or race (Asiedu et al. 2012).
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, access to credit is a determi-
nant of entrepreneurship –entry and exit rates of the incorporated self-employed increased
significantly after branching deregulation. However, we do not find any effects on the en-
try into unincorporated self-employment from non-business owners. Second, we find that
credit access influences organizational structure. For example, reforms increased incorpo-
3Previous studies identify all self-employed individuals as entrepreneurs (Borjas and Bronas 1989, Fairlie
2014, among many others). However, Levine and Rubinstein (2017) argue that incorporated self-employed
is a better proxy for entrepreneurship, because their cognitive and non-cognitive traits are more consistent
with what one expects from an entrepreneur (see Section 3 for more details).
4When a business becomes incorporated, it will have a separate legal identity and limited liability (i.e.
the firm can enter into contracts and own property independently of its owners, and its owners are not
fully responsible for the firm’s debts). However, becoming an incorporated business involves both direct and
indirect costs such as annual fees, higher tax rates, and organizational costs.
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ration among previously unincorporated self-employed. Finally, banking deregulation had
heterogeneous effects on different groups, especially on those who are likely to face binding
credit constraints. We find that deregulation had a stronger impact on entry and exit rates
of minorities and the young into business ownership.
This chapter relates to a growing literature that investigates why individuals engage in
entrepreneurship given its risky nature (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen 2002). One view
is that entrepreneurs are different from wage and salary workers by having different attitudes
towards risk (Hall and Woodward 2010) and/or placing a greater value on non-pecuniary
benefits (Hurst and Pugsley 2017). A second, and not mutually exclusive, viewpoint is that
individuals’ likelihood of engaging in entrepreneurship would change had they faced different
economic conditions. In this strand of research, our chapter relates to studies that have
investigated whether financial constraints impede entrepreneurship. Evans and Javanovic
(1989) develop an occupational choice model where individuals can become entrepreneurs,
and show that liquidity constraints hinder individuals with insufficient funds from starting
their businesses. Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994) show that entrepreneurs who received large
inheritances are more likely to stay in business (see also Blanchflower and Oswald 1998,
Cagetti and De Nardi 2006). Hurst and Lusardi (2004) show that having wealth increases
the propensity to become a business owner only at the top of wealth distribution, otherwise
it has no effect.
Using wealth to draw inferences about liquidity constraints may potentially suffer from
endogeneity as wealth itself may be linked to unobserved attributes such as talent, ability, and
work ethic. Further, individuals’ occupational decisions resulting from a change in wealth
do not necessarily reflect their behavior when there is a change in credit access. When
individuals use their own assets to engage in entrepreneurship, they undertake all of the
risk associated with the venture. In contrast, when they are able to use a credit agreement,
the lender shares the underlying risk with the borrower. Our approach has two advantages.
First, we do not use wealth to draw inferences about liquidity constraints, and the timing
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of branching deregulation are unlikely to be related to an individual’s characteristics, which
may affect her decision to become a business owner. Second, we test how changes in credit
access affect entrepreneurship.
Within the bank deregulation literature, this chapter relates to Black and Strahan (2002)
and Kerr and Nanda (2009 & 2010), who investigate the impact of US banking deregulation
on entrepreneurship. Black and Strahan (2002), using data on new business incorporation
compiled by Dun and Bradstreet over the 1976–1994, find that the rate of new incorporation
increased following deregulation of branching restrictions. Kerr and Nanda (2009) use US
Census Bureau data on establishments between 1977 and 1998, and investigate the impact of
bank deregulation on business creation and closure. They find that the greatest increase in
entry occurred among small start-ups, and most of business closures occurred among small,
young firms.
This study differs from the above studies in the following key aspects. First, consistent
with the above literature on occupational choice and entrepreneurship (Evans and Javanovic
1989, Hurst and Pugsley 2017), we examine the impact of bank deregulation on an individ-
ual’s choice to engage in entrepreneurship. In contrast, Black and Strahan (2002) use the
number of new incorporation per capita as a measure of entrepreneurship, and Kerr and
Nanda (2009 & 2010) use the number of new establishments created by the payroll firms.
Thus these studies exclude the majority of self-employed, which constitutes over 60 percent
of US businesses.5 Second, we distinguish between incorporated and unincorporated business
owners, and show that the impact of reforms varies significantly across these groups. Equally
important, we show that reforms affected businesses’ organizational forms (e.g., increased in-
corporation among previously unincorporated business owners). Finally, we investigate how
reforms affected business ownership among different groups, especially among those who are
likely to face credit constraints.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the data and explains
5This statistics is based on the Federal Reserve’s 2015 Small Business Credit Survey (see also Fairlie
2014).
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the construction of the data on entrepreneurial activity. Section 3.3 describes the details of
the econometric methodology that we employ. Section 3.4 presents our results, and Section
3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data
The data used in this chapter are drawn from several sources covering the period be-
tween 1980–2007. Entrepreneurial activity is measured by business creation and closure
at individual-owner level. Using the Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group
(CPS-ORG) files from Unicon Research Corporation (2015), we identify self-employed work-
ers (who are predominantly small business owners).6 The CPS-ORG is a monthly household
survey where each household is interviewed for four consecutive months in one year, followed
by four consecutive months one year later (after which they leave the sample permanently).
In order to identify entry and exit of entrepreneurs in each state and year, we use this rotat-
ing feature of the data. The CPS-ORG files start in 1979, so we can identify entry and exit
cohorts from 1980 onward. Our sample ends in 2007, because we do not want our estimates
to be influenced by financial regulations passed during the Great Recession.7
Self-employed individuals in the CPS files are classified into two categories: incorporated
and unincorporated. Previous studies used all self-employed individuals as a measure for
entrepreneurship (Borjas and Bronars 1989, Fairlie 2014, among many others). However,
this measure generates some puzzling outcomes in the sense that entrepreneurship does not
appear to offer economic rewards. For example, studies have documented that the median
self-employed worker has lower initial earnings and slower earning growth than wage and
salary workers (Hamilton 2000, Hurst and Pugsley 2017). Levine and Rubinstein (2017) show
6Unicon Corporation cleaned up the problems in the raw CPS files provided by the Census Bureau and
recorded variables so that the surveys became more comparable across years. In addition, as we shall discuss
shortly, it also provides (publicly unavailable) variables that we exploit in our analysis.
7In 1994, the Census Bureau redesigned the CPS to improve the quality and quantity of the data collected,
which led to changes in the population shares of some variables (Hipple 2010). As a robustness check, we
conduct analysis using only data prior to 1994. Our results qualitatively remain the same (see Table A.2 in
the appendix).
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that these two groups have significantly different traits and earning profiles: the incorporated
self-employed generally are more educated, work more hours, and earn much more per hour
than salaried and unincorporated ones.8 Therefore, our analysis separate these two groups,
but mainly focuses on the incorporated who are more entrepreneurial.
Our sample includes all individuals between the ages of 25 and 55, but excludes those with
imputed/missing worker class and inconsistent reports (Levine and Rubinstein 2017).9 Prior
to 1994, in the publicly available CPS files all incorporated self-employed individuals were
classified as wage and salary workers. However, the CPS-ORG files from Unicorn Research
Corporation include an unedited and unallocated worker-class variable through which we are
able to identify incorporated self-employed correctly for the years prior to 1994. The CPS
provides information on individuals’ age, gender, race, marital status, and education level as
well as their employment status, worker class, industry worked, and weekly hours worked.10
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics on key variables for self-employed and wage & salary
workers, which are mainly in line with Levine and Rubinstein (2017).11 Compared to wage
& salary workers, most of self-employed individuals are male, white, and work longer hours.
The percent of individuals who have at least some college education is very comparable
across both groups. The percent of individuals who work in manufacturing is substantially
higher for wage & salary workers, whereas the share of self-employed working in the private
service sector is very similar to that of wage & salary workers in this sector. However, a
8Levine and Rubinstein use the March CPS files for years between 1995 and 2012. We do not use the
March CPS, because the data do not distinguish incorporated self-employed from the unincorporated in the
survey years prior to 1988.
9Following Levine and Rubinstein (2017), we also exclude individuals who work in public administration
sector, because almost no entrepreneurial activity takes place in this sector.
10Industry classification over the sample period has changed three times, and thus we aggregate indus-
tries under the following 11 broad sectors: Agriculture & Mining, Construction, Manufacturing, Transporta-
tion/Utility/Information, Wholesale, Retail, Finance & Insurance, Professional, Repair, and Personal &
Entertainment, and Public Administration. Analysis based on a detailed classification with 22 sectors yields
very similar results. As we mentioned above, our final sample excludes Public Administration.
11Statistics in Table 1.A are based on the final dataset that we used in our regressions. Our original
data have about 3.8 million observations on two rotating groups, each having about 1.9 million observations.
After matching process described below, we have about 1.1 million observations (see the last row in Table
3.1). However, statistics based on the original sample yields very similar results to those in Table 3.1
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics on Self-employed and Wage Workers, 1980–2007
Self-employed Salary
All Incorporated Unincorporated Workers
Female (%) 29.9 23.1 33.0 46.8
(45.8) (42.2) (47.0) (49.9)
Age 41.6 42.4 41.2 39.6
(7.8) (7.4) (7.9) (8.2)
White (%) 92.2 92.9 91.9 85.4
(26.8) (25.7) (27.3) (35.3)
Some College (%) 58.3 70.9 52.7 53.8
(49.3) (45.4) (49.9) (49.9)
Hours Worked 44.7 48.0 43.2 40.6
(17.5) (15.7) (18.1) (11.3)
Manufacturing (%) 15.3 12.5 16.5 24.0
(36.0) (33.1) (37.1) (42.7)
Service (%) 68.6 72.9 66.7 69.9
(46.4) (44.4) (47.1) (45.8)
Sample Size 147,903 43,925 103,978 960,624
Notes: The data draw on the CPS-ORG Files from Unicon Corporation (2015). Some College represents
fraction of individuals who have at least some college education, and Hours Worked represents total hours
worked last week. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations, and the CPS weights are used in all
calculations.
Table 3.2 Entrepreneurial Activity at Individual-Owner Level, 1980–2007
Entry Rate (%) Exit Rate (%) Switching
Incorp. Unincorp. Incorp. Unincorp. Rate (%)
All Sample 1.4 2.5 33.3 26.2 7.3
(11.8) (15.6) (47.1) (44.0) (26.0)
Female 0.8 1.9 39.1 28.9 5.1
(9.2) (13.8) (48.8) (45.3) (21.9)
White 1.5 2.6 32.5 25.4 7.2
(12.1) (15.9) (46.9) (43.5) (25.8)
Some College 1.8 2.6 32.7 28.1 9.0
(13.3) (15.8) (46.9) (45.0) (28.7)
Manufacturing 0.5 0.5 31.6 43.0 8.8
(7.2) (6.8) (46.5) (49.5) (28.3)
Service 1.5 2.6 34.3 28.7 8.1
(12.2) (15.8) (47.5) (45.2) (27.2)
Notes: The data draw on the CPS-ORG Files from Unicon Corporation (2015). Some College represents
individuals who have at least some college education. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations, and
the CPS weights are used in all calculations.
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comparison of incorporated self-employed with other groups reveals that this group is mostly
white, male, who are significantly more educated, and work longer hours.12
Upon this classification, we can easily determine entry to and exit from entrepreneurship.
New entrepreneurs in year t are individuals who changed their worker class to self-employed
from time t− 1 to t. Similarly, exiting entrepreneurs in year t are self-employed individuals
who changed their worker class to non-business owners from time t − 1 to t.13 We also
identify switchers in year t as those unincorporated self-employed individuals who changed
their worker class to incorporated self-employed from time t− 1 to t.
This process clearly requires tracking of individuals over time. However, the CPS is a
household survey, and does not have individual identifiers. Following Madrian and Lefgren
(2000) and Ziliak et al. (2011), we uniquely match pairs using identical household ID,
household number, record lines, sex, survey month, and race. We only consider individuals
with age and schooling difference in two successive years less than two, and dropped all
unmatched individuals from the sample.14
Table 3.2 reports summary statistics on the average entry and exit rates of each group
as well as the average rate of switching from unincorporated to incorporated for different
groups. The average annual entry (exit) rate is 1.4 (33.3) percent for incorporated self-
employed, whereas it is 2.5 (26.2) percent for the unincorporated. About 7.3 percent of
the unincorporated self-employed became incorporated. A comparison of the first row with
rows 2–4 indicates that the average entry and switching rates are higher among white, male,
and college educated individuals. Similarly, the average exit rate is generally smaller among
white, male, and college educated individuals. Finally, the entry, exit, and switching rates
12As noted by many others (e.g., Acemoglu and Autor 2011), the reported earnings of self-employed in the
CPS files are not reliable. A significant portion of self-employed individuals reported zero weekly earnings.
13We find that about 57 percent of exiting entrepreneurs become wage & salary workers, 41 percent
unincorporated self-employed, and the remaining 2 percent unemployed.
14Consistent with Ziliak et al. (2011), this process usually yields 60 percent matching success, which
leaves us about 1.1 million observations. Household IDs assigned in 1985 are problematic and the CPS had a
major design change in 1994, and thus matching rates in these years were around 30-40 percent. Excluding
these years in the analysis does not have any appreciable effects on our results.
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are significantly higher in the private service sector than those in manufacturing.
Data on the timing of bank deregulation comes from Amel (2008). Banking activities in
Delaware and South Dakota are skewed by the presence of credit card banks. Therefore, our
analysis covers 48 states over the 1980–2007 period.
3.3 Econometric Specifications
Following the approach outlined in the previous chapter, we use a difference-in-difference
model to investigate the effects of banking deregulation on entrepreneurship. We begin our
analysis by estimating the following linear probability model:
Yisjt = αIntrast + βInterst + γXist + ηs + ηj + ηt + ηst+ ηjt+ εst, (3.1)
where Intrast ,Interst, and Xist remained as previously defined in chapter 2. Intrast (Interst)
is a dummy variable that identifies whether intrastate (interstate) banking deregulation is
in effect in state s and year t. The dependent variable Y measures either entry or exit of
entrepreneurs at individual level. Yisjt is a dummy variable, which equals one if individual i
in state s and industry j becomes an entrepreneur in year t and zero otherwise; or equals one
if an entrepreneur i in year t becomes non-entrepreneur and zero otherwise. Our coefficients
of interest are α and β.
State and industry fixed effects (ηs and ηj) are included to control for any time invariant
state- and industry-specific factors that can affect entrepreneurship, and year fixed effects
(ηt) to control for common shocks to economies. Finally, state-specific and industry-specific
time trends (ηst and ηjt) are included to account for other trending factors that can in-
fluence entrepreneurship. Consistent with the approach in the previous chapter, we use
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the state level.
As in chapter 2, we conduct an event study, in which we estimate the following dynamic
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equation:
Yisjt =
15∑
τ=−8
ατ Intra
τ
st +
15∑
τ=−8
βτ Inter
τ
st + γXist + ηs + ηj + ηt + εst. (3.2)
As in the previous chapter, we extend the original difference-in difference model by including
a set of dummies that take a value of one in the τth year before or after the banking
deregulation and zero otherwise, and the end points include all earlier and later years.15 We
exclude the year of deregulation, and thus the coefficients measure yearly performance of
entrepreneurial activity relative to reform years. If our identification assumption is valid,
the estimated coefficients on αv and βv for v < 0 should not be statistically different from
zero. This dynamic approach also allows us to see if there are any lagged effects of the
banking reforms on entrepreneurship.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Benchmark
Table 3.3 reports the effects of banking reforms on entry and exit of the incorporated self-
employed based on equation (3.1).16 All regressions include state, industry, and year fixed
effects. Columns 1 and 2 report the impact of deregulation on the likelihood that a non-
business owner (i.e., wage and salary workers) subsequently enters into incorporated self-
employment, and note that the interstate deregulation has positive and highly significant
effects on the likelihood that a non-business owner enters into incorporated self-employment.
Since the entry rate prior to the interstate reform was about 0.63 percent, results reported
15Our dynamic equation is similar to Beck et al. (2010). As shown in Table A.1 in the appendix, most
of the banking deregulation happened during the 1980s, and in our data the first entry cohort is 1980; as
a result, we include only 8 years before the deregulation. Kerr and Nanda (2009) and Beck et al. (2010)
estimate their dynamic models without any control variables. Excluding X from equation (3.2), however,
yields similar results.
16As discussed above, the Census Bureau redesigned the CPS in 1994, which led to changes in the
population shares of some variables (Hipple 2010). Table A.2 in the appendix reports results using the data
over 1980–1993, and for brevity, we only report estimates on the Intra and Inter variables (although all
regressions include all variables specified in equation (3.1)). A comparison with Table 3.3 indicates that
results qualitatively remain mostly the same.
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Table 3.3 Impact of Deregulation on Incorporated Self-employed, 1980–2007
Entry to Incorporated from Exit from Incorporated to
Non-Business Unincorporated Non-Business Unincorporated
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Intra 0.0009 0.0007 0.0111∗ 0.0009 0.0183∗∗ 0.0111 0.0143 0.0168
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0062) (0.0051) (0.0081) (0.0101) (0.0113) (0.0116)
Inter 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0040 0.0040 0.0054 0.0068 0.0350∗∗ 0.0405∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0064) (0.0055) (0.0111) (0.0130) (0.0133) (0.0152)
Female −0.0033∗∗∗ −0.0455∗∗∗ 0.0761∗∗∗ 0.0136∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0034) (0.0059) (0.0064)
Black −0.0038∗∗∗ 0.0106 0.1027∗∗∗ 0.0971∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0087) (0.0307) (0.0179)
Other 0.0015 0.0330∗∗∗ 0.0675∗∗∗ 0.0431∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0120) (0.0131) (0.0160)
Married 0.0040∗∗∗ 0.0236∗∗∗ −0.0260∗∗∗ −0.0550∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0036) (0.0079) (0.0070)
Age 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0008 −0.0251∗∗∗ −0.0168∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0015) (0.0032) (0.0040)
Age2 −0.0000∗∗∗ −0.0000 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
High School 0.0038∗∗∗ 0.0301∗∗∗ −0.0192∗ −0.0907∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0037) (0.0100) (0.0163)
Some College 0.0070∗∗∗ 0.0418∗∗∗ −0.0290∗∗∗ −0.1252∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0051) (0.0107) (0.0179)
College 0.0137∗∗∗ 0.0837∗∗∗ −0.0194 −0.1388∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0062) (0.0117) (0.0188)
Entrpt−1 0.0409
∗∗∗ 0.1937 0.0631 0.0553
(0.0126) (0.1628) (0.3867) (0.3228)
Time Trends No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 945,440 930,166 85,252 84,179 36,476 36,075 34,784 34,391
Notes: All regressions include state, industry, and year fixed effects; and regressions are weighted by the CPS weights. Numbers in parentheses are
the robust standard errors clustered at the state level, and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
in column 2 imply that deregulation increased the entry rate by 38 percent.
Columns 3 and 4 show the effects on the likelihood that an unincorporated self-employed
worker incorporates. The estimated coefficients imply that the reforms did not have any
significant effect on their entry. Consistent with the summary statistics reported in Table 3.2,
the estimated coefficients on the control variables in columns 2 and 4 imply that educated,
married males are more likely to become an entrepreneur. Similarly, compared to whites,
blacks are less likely to enter into self-employment.
Columns 5–8 report the impact on the likelihood of exit from incorporated-self employ-
ment. An incorporated business owners may become a wage and salary worker (columns 5
and 6) or may simply become unincorporated (columns 7 and 8). Reforms had no significant
impact on incorporated self-employed individuals becoming wage and salary workers. How-
ever, interstate banking reforms increased the likelihood that an incorporated self-employed
individual becomes an unincorporated business owner by 4 percentage points, which is sub-
stantial given that the exit rate among this group prior to the reforms was about 18.5 percent.
Observe that exit rates are higher among females, non-whites, young, and the less-educated.
The validity of these results depends on our assumption that there are no pre-treatment
trends in the outcome variables. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the estimated coefficients on lag
and lead variables in equation (3.2) along with their 95-percent confidence intervals. Observe
that the pre-treatment effect is usually small and statistically insignificant, which suggests
that the identification assumption is not violated. There is a jump in estimates on the lagged
values of the interstate deregulation for non-business owners (Figure 3.1 top right panel),
and the estimates for the first four years are statistically significant at the 5-percent level.
Further, the bottom right panel of 3.1 shows an upward trend in post-reform years .
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Intrastate: Entry from Non-Business Owners Interstate: Entry from Non-Business Owners
Intrastate: Entry from Unincorporated Self-employed Interstate: Entry from Unincorporated Self-employed
Figure 3.1: Estimated Coefficients from Equation (2) for Entry into Incorporated Self-employed.
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Intrastate: Exit to Non-Business Owners Interstate: Exit to Non-Business Owners
Intrastate: Exit to Unincorporated Self-employed Interstate: Exit to Unincorporated Self-employed
Figure 3.2: Estimated Coefficients from Equation (2) for Exit from Incorporated Self-employed.
These effects can not be captured by equation (3.1); thus, we extend equation (3.1) by
including three dummy variables for each reform:
Yisjt = α1Intra{1,2} + α2Intra{3,4} + α3Intra{5+} + β1Inter{1,2} + β2Inter{3,4} + β3Inter{5+}
+ γXist + ηs + ηj + ηt + ηst+ ηjt+ εst,
(3.3)
where, for clarity, we dropped state and time indexes in reform variables. Here, for example,
Intra{1,2} equals one for the first two years of the intrastate reform and zero otherwise,
Intra{3,4} equals one for the third and fourth years of the reform, and Inter{5+} equals one
for the fifth year after the reform or later.
Table 3.4 represent the results based on equation (3.3). For brevity, we do not report
estimates on controls, but they are similar to those reported in Table 3.3. Note that the es-
timated coefficients on interstate deregulation are very similar to those reported in columns
1 and 2 in Table 3.3. The interstate reform also increased the likelihood that the unincorpo-
rated self-employed incorporates. Specifically, according to column 4, the entry rate among
this group is higher by 40 percent 5 years after the reform (the pre-reform entry rate was
about 7.2 percent).
Column 5–8 show the effects of reforms on the probability of exit from incorporated
self-employment. The effects of the interstate deregulation are mostly insignificant on those
who become non-business owners, and positive and significant on those who become un-
incorporated. Increased competition in the market after banking reforms increase failure
rates among the incorporated self-employed, but the fact that deregulation has an impact on
those who became unincorporated self-employed indicates that there is more to the story. In
the subsequent section, we shall explore heterogeneity across different groups, and find that
the reforms increased the likelihood of exit from business ownership among incorporated
minorities and the young.
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Table 3.4 Impact of Banking Deregulations on Incorporated Self-employed, 1980–2007
Entry to Incorporated from Exit from Incorporated to
Non-Business Unincorporated Non-Business Unincorporated
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Intra{1,2} 0.0003 0.0005 0.0087 0.0034 0.0175 0.0172 0.0185 0.0239
∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0059) (0.0062) (0.0125) (0.0133) (0.0148) (0.0141)
Intra{3,4} 0.0008 0.0009 0.0082 −0.0023 −0.0042 −0.0026 −0.0007 0.0062
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0058) (0.0067) (0.0112) (0.0128) (0.0157) (0.0181)
Intra{5+} 0.0013 0.0013
∗ 0.0123 −0.0023 0.0223∗∗ 0.0198 0.0194 0.0206
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0088) (0.0071) (0.0101) (0.0166) (0.0133) (0.0214)
Inter{1,2} 0.0021
∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0018 0.0027 −0.0048 −0.0011 0.0332∗∗ 0.0383∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0064) (0.0059) (0.0124) (0.0133) (0.0135) (0.0150)
Inter{3,4} 0.0022
∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0075 0.0120 0.0249 0.0307∗ 0.0374∗∗ 0.0452∗
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0087) (0.0079) (0.0148) (0.0162) (0.0185) (0.0226)
Inter{5+} 0.0022
∗ 0.0023∗∗ 0.0252∗ 0.0297∗∗ 0.0218 0.0275 0.0329∗ 0.0413∗
(0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0143) (0.0129) (0.0137) (0.0186) (0.0182) (0.0233)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Time Trends No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 945,440 930,166 85,252 84,179 36,476 36,075 34,784 34,391
Notes: All regressions include all fixed effects and controls specified in equation (3); and regressions are weighted by the CPS weights. Numbers in
parentheses are the robust standard errors clustered at the state level, and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
Table 3.5 Impact of Deregulation on Unincorporated Self-employed, 1980–2007
Entry Exit
Variable 1 2 3 4
Intra −0.0009 0.0005 −0.0068 −0.0033
(0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0073) (0.0064)
Inter −0.0010 −0.0007 −0.0093 −0.0023
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0062) (0.0064)
Female −0.0017∗∗∗ 0.0703∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0049)
Black −0.0048∗∗∗ 0.1007∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0093)
Other 0.0020 0.0460∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0100)
Married 0.0018∗∗∗ −0.0302∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0034)
Age 0.0012∗∗∗ −0.0214∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0027)
Age2 −0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000)
High School 0.0007 −0.0291∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0067)
Some College 0.0024∗ −0.0305∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0075)
College 0.0039∗∗ −0.0374∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0089)
Entrpt−1 0.0055 −0.0139
(0.0169) (0.1550)
Time Trends No Yes No Yes
Observations 957,273 941,811 96,324 95,028
Notes: All regressions include state, industry, and year fixed effects; and regressions are weighted by the
CPS weights. Numbers in parentheses are the robust standard errors clustered at the state level, and ∗∗∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 3.6 Impact of Banking Deregulation on Unincorporated Self-employed, 1980–2007
Entry Exit
Variable 1 2 3 4
Intra{1,2} −0.0004 0.0009 −0.0064 −0.0034
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0080) (0.0078)
Intra{3,4} −0.0015 −0.0001 −0.0069 −0.0016
(0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0076) (0.0076)
Intra{5+} −0.0011 0.0012 −0.0064 −0.0071
(0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0096) (0.0085)
Inter{1,2} −0.0010 −0.0007 −0.0065 0.0006
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0073) (0.0073)
Inter{3,4} −0.0008 −0.0007 −0.0165∗∗ −0.0076
(0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0068) (0.0075)
Inter{5+} 0.0011 0.0013 −0.0100 0.0006
(0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0097) (0.0095)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Time Trends No Yes No Yes
Observations 957,273 941,811 96,324 95,028
Notes: All regressions include all fixed effects and controls specified in equation (3); and regressions are weighted by the CPS weights. Numbers in
parentheses are the robust standard errors clustered at the state level, and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
We now turn to investigate the effects of banking deregulation on the business dynamics of
the unincorporated self-employed. Table 3.5 reports the regression results based on equation
(3.1), and Figure 3.3 plots the estimated coefficients on lag and lead variables in equation
(3.2) along with their 95-percent confidence intervals.17 According to Tables 3.5 and Figure
3.3, reforms had no effect on the entry or exit of unincorporated self-employed. We obtain
similar results using the more flexible model (3.3) as shown in Table 3.6.
Our analysis indicates that branching has different effects on the entry and exit rates of
incorporated versus unincorporated self-employed. We show that most of these effects are
concentrated among incorporated business owners. Thus, consistent with Levine and Rubin-
stein (2017), distinguishing between these two groups is important. Using all self-employed
as a measure of entrepreneurship misses insights stemming from the differences between these
two groups. Furthermore, we find that bank deregulation had an impact on organizational
structure. The reforms increased propensity of a previously incorporated (unincorporated)
business to transition into an unincorporated (incorporated) business. These effects are not
captured in the previous studies, which relied on measures of entrepreneurship among mostly
incorporated businesses (Black and Strahan 2002, Kerr and Nanda 2009).
Black and Strahan (2002), using state-level Dun and Bradstreet incorporation data over
the 1976–1994 period, find that the rate of new incorporation increased following banking
deregulation. Our finding is similar to theirs, although we define entrepreneurship at the
individual-owner level. In addition, our analysis indicates that some of the increase in
incorporation comes from previously unincorporated businesses. Kerr and Nanda (2009)
use data from the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) of US Census Bureau over 1977–
1998 to examine entrepreneurship and creative destruction following banking deregulation.18
They find that interstate bank deregulation has a positive and significant impact on small
start-ups, while intrastate deregulation has no effect on firm entry. They also find that
17We only consider the effects on non-business owners and also exclude all individuals becoming an
incorporated self-employed.
18LBD database covers only establishments with payroll, and thus excludes most of the businesses operated
by self-employed individuals.
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Intrastate: Entry from Non-Business Owners Interstate: Entry from Non-Business Owners
Intrastate: Exit to Non-Business Owners Interstate: Exit to Non-Business Owners
Figure 3.3: Estimated Coefficients from Equation (2) for Entry/Exit of Unincorporated Self-employed.
interstate deregulation increases business closures significantly among small start-ups. How-
ever, we show that the reforms did not have a uniform impact on all small businesses.
Branching predominantly affected incorporated businesses, and have no observed impact on
newly unincorporated businesses. Thus, branching did not have significant effect on the
majority of unincorporated self-employed, which covers over 60 percent of US businesses.
3.4.2 Effects by Gender, Race and Age
Several studies have shown that certain groups (e.g., women and minorities) face higher bar-
riers in credit markets to get loans. Using data from the Survey of Small Business Finances,
Asiedu et al. (2012) find that the denial rate in a sample of loan applications in 2003 is about
30 percent higher for minority-owned firms compared to white males. Branching deregula-
tion may alleviate the discrimination against these groups in two ways. First, increased
competition in credit markets may induce banks to extend credits to previously excluded
individuals. For example, Sun and Yannelis (2016) show that lifting intrastate banking re-
strictions raised college enrollment by about 2.6 percentage points. Second, banking reforms
couple with technological innovations may induce banks to develop a more standard screen-
ing process where face-to-face communications will be minimum. Tewari (2014), for example,
finds that following the branching deregulation mortgage access increased for lower-middle
income groups, young, and black households; and she argues that banks’ new screening
technologies may have been responsible for this expansion.
We investigate how branching reforms have affected entrepreneurship among different
groups, and exploit the detailed nature of the CPS data in order to address this prob-
lem. We explore heterogeneity by gender, race, and age. Table 3.7 reports the effects of
deregulation on entrepreneurship among females and males.19 Regressions include controls,
fixed effects, state-specific and industry-specific time trends. There are three findings to
note: first, the effects of interstate deregulation on the entry among non-business owners are
19In this section, results based on the standard model (3.1) are reported in the appendix. See Tables A.3,
A.4.
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Table 3.7 Impact of Deregulation on Entrepreneurship (1980–2007), by Gender
Incorporated
Entry from Exit to Unincorporated
Non-Bus. Uninc. Non-Bus. Uninc. Entry Exit
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel A. Females
Intra{1,2} 0.0001 −0.0076 0.0043 0.0181 0.0005 −0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0087) (0.0321) (0.0364) (0.0012) (0.0137)
Intra{3,4} 0.0005 −0.0069 −0.0298 −0.0240 −0.0014 −0.0032
(0.0006) (0.0107) (0.0321) (0.0401) (0.0017) (0.0158)
Intra{5+} 0.0009 −0.0050 0.0362 −0.0234 0.0003 0.0094
(0.0007) (0.0125) (0.0357) (0.0460) (0.0017) (0.0191)
Inter{1,2} 0.0010 0.0009 −0.0256 0.0589 −0.0006 0.0058
(0.0006) (0.0064) (0.0380) (0.0402) (0.0017) (0.0144)
Inter{3,4} 0.0016
∗∗ 0.0140 0.0403 0.0927∗∗ −0.0023 −0.0201
(0.0006) (0.0117) (0.0382) (0.0434) (0.0018) (0.0193)
Inter{5+} 0.0014
∗∗ 0.0167 0.0332 0.0918∗∗ −0.0002 −0.0104
(0.0006) (0.0150) (0.0407) (0.0440) (0.0024) (0.0219)
Obs. 445,537 26,168 8,319 7,329 450,975 32,372
Panel B. Males
Inter{1,2} 0.0008 0.0081 0.0178 0.0256
∗ 0.0012 −0.0041
(0.0010) (0.0070) (0.0147) (0.0133) (0.0015) (0.0084)
Inter{3,4} 0.0011 0.0001 −0.0007 0.0106 0.0011 0.0007
(0.0008) (0.0074) (0.0137) (0.0187) (0.0015) (0.0111)
Inter{5+} 0.0016 −0.0013 0.0115 0.0282 0.0020 −0.0137
(0.0011) (0.0086) (0.0184) (0.0218) (0.0015) (0.0112)
Inter{1,2} 0.0034
∗∗∗ 0.0038 0.0036 0.0317∗∗ −0.0007 −0.0002
(0.0011) (0.0071) (0.0157) (0.0130) (0.0013) (0.0080)
Inter{3,4} 0.0032
∗∗ 0.0105 0.0255 0.0339 0.0008 −0.0002
(0.0013) (0.0078) (0.0189) (0.0219) (0.0020) (0.0088)
Inter{5+} 0.0031
∗ 0.0338∗∗ 0.0241 0.0305 0.0027 0.0077
(0.0017) (0.0129) (0.0218) (0.0237) (0.0021) (0.0100)
Obs. 484,629 58,019 27,756 27,062 490,836 62,656
Notes: All regressions include all fixed effects and controls specified in equation (3); and regressions are
weighted by the CPS weights. Numbers in parentheses are the robust standard errors clustered at the state
level, and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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stronger for males. Second, the likelihood that the unincorporated self-employed becomes
an incorporated business owner increased among males, but not females. Third, the exit
rate of the incorporated self-employed after deregulation is higher among females.
Next, we investigate the impact of banking reforms on entrepreneurship among racial
minorities relative to whites, and the results are reported in Table 3.8. First, according to
column 1, the likelihood that a non-business owner enters into incorporated self-employment
is higher among non-whites. Since non-whites generally have lower initial wealth (Fairlie and
Robb 2008), the marginal value of an increase in credit is higher for them. Consequently,
relaxing credit constraints have stronger effects for minorities. For whites, we observe that
there is an increase in the incorporation rate among previously unincorporated businesses
(see column 2). Second, the reforms increased business closure rate substantially among
incorporated non-white entrepreneurs, while having no such effects on whites. However,
following reforms, incorporated whites are more likely to become unincorporated. Finally,
the reforms increased exit rate among unincorporated non-whites, but decreased it among
whites (column 6).
Higher exit rates after the deregulation can be explained by the increased competition
created by these reforms. Why do minorities choose to exit the business entirely, while whites
typically become unincorporated? One possibility is that whites do business in sectors where
transitioning from a corporate to a non-corporate entity is relatively easier. However, our
data does not seem to support this view. Because differences in the distributions of industries
across these groups are not particularly large.20 A plausible explanation is that whites run
businesses with more assets that can induce them to stay in business. According to the
2012 Small Business Owners (SBO) survey, white owned firms have average sales of about
$500,000 compared with $365,000 for those owned by Asians and $58,000 for those owned
by blacks. For example, Fairlie and Robb (2008) find that black-owned businesses
20For example, among whites exiting from incorporated self-employment, 23 percent were doing business
in wholesale and retail sectors and 9 percent in finance, insurance, and real estate sectors. The corresponding
statistics for non-whites are 31 percent and 5 percent, respectively.
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Table 3.8 Impact of Deregulation on Entrepreneurship (1980–2007), by Race
Incorporated
Entry from Exit to Unincorporated
Non-Bus. Uninc. Non-Bus. Uninc. Entry Exit
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel A. Non-whites
Intra{1,2} −0.0004 0.0596∗ 0.1099 0.0087 −0.0032 0.0895∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0337) (0.0890) (0.0703) (0.0020) (0.0389)
Intra{3,4} 0.0013 −0.0054 0.2181∗∗ 0.0144 −0.0040 0.0770∗
(0.0012) (0.0291) (0.0986) (0.0848) (0.0026) (0.0387)
Intra{5+} 0.0003 −0.0070 0.1447∗ 0.0373 −0.0031 0.0443
(0.0014) (0.0331) (0.0830) (0.1025) (0.0030) (0.0378)
Inter{1,2} 0.0039
∗∗ −0.0373 0.0920 −0.0117 0.0040 0.0341
(0.0015) (0.0275) (0.0698) (0.0822) (0.0025) (0.0203)
Inter{3,4} 0.0027
∗∗∗ −0.0147 0.1742∗∗∗ −0.0157 0.0016 0.0911∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0295) (0.0595) (0.0997) (0.0023) (0.0353)
Inter{5+} 0.0035
∗∗ −0.0131 0.2048∗∗∗ 0.0738 0.0045 0.1268∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0258) (0.0639) (0.1133) (0.0031) (0.0284)
Obs. 117,595 5,179 2,121 1,973 118,891 6,321
Panel B. Whites
Intra{1,2} 0.0007 0.0004 0.0138 0.0239 0.0014 −0.0083
(0.0007) (0.0061) (0.0121) (0.0142) (0.0011) (0.0080)
Intra{3,4} 0.0009 −0.0022 −0.0101 0.0043 0.0004 −0.0062
(0.0006) (0.0067) (0.0138) (0.0177) (0.0014) (0.0079)
Intra{5+} 0.0015
∗ −0.0026 0.0160 0.0182 0.0017 −0.0095
(0.0008) (0.0078) (0.0177) (0.0202) (0.0015) (0.0082)
Inter{1,2} 0.0021
∗∗ 0.0055 −0.0051 0.0413∗∗∗ −0.0014 −0.0018
(0.0008) (0.0058) (0.0135) (0.0137) (0.0013) (0.0073)
Inter{3,4} 0.0025
∗∗∗ 0.0131∗ 0.0225 0.0470∗∗ −0.0012 −0.0144∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0077) (0.0174) (0.0206) (0.0016) (0.0066)
Inter{5+} 0.0021
∗ 0.0316∗∗ 0.0162 0.0386∗ 0.0007 −0.0082
(0.0011) (0.0133) (0.0205) (0.0211) (0.0023) (0.0088)
Obs. 812,571 79,000 33,954 32,418 822,920 88,707
Notes: Regressions include all fixed effects, time trends, and controls as specified in equation (3), and are
weighted by the CPS weights. Numbers in parentheses are the robust standard errors clustered at the state
level, and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 3.9 Impact of Deregulation on Entrepreneurship (1980–2007), by Age
Incorporated
Entry from Exit to Unincorporated
Non-Bus. Uninc. Non-Bus. Uninc. Entry Exit
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel A. Young (Age < 40)
Intra{1,2} −0.0008 0.0086 0.0396 0.0314 0.0003 0.0078
(0.0008) (0.0084) (0.0292) (0.0257) (0.0016) (0.0132)
Intra{3,4} −0.0007 −0.0014 0.0240 0.0069 −0.0004 0.0126
(0.0008) (0.0067) (0.0261) (0.0299) (0.0019) (0.0102)
Intra{5+} −0.0006 −0.0084 0.0448 0.0255 0.0003 0.0112
(0.0008) (0.0061) (0.0270) (0.0409) (0.0019) (0.0128)
Inter{1,2} 0.0024
∗∗∗ 0.0048 0.0084 0.0646∗∗ −0.0019 0.0082
(0.0008) (0.0084) (0.0209) (0.0266) (0.0013) (0.0101)
Inter{3,4} 0.0026
∗∗ 0.0249∗∗ 0.0673∗∗ 0.0790∗∗∗ −0.0022 −0.0090
(0.0011) (0.0110) (0.0256) (0.0269) (0.0018) (0.0114)
Inter{5+} 0.0032
∗∗ 0.0377∗∗ 0.0648∗∗ 0.0964∗∗∗ −0.0000 −0.0091
(0.0013) (0.0172) (0.0307) (0.0339) (0.0025) (0.0105)
Obs. 481,673 35,390 12,853 12,039 488,462 41,490
Panel B. Old (Age > 40)
Intra{1,2} 0.0023
∗∗ −0.0020 0.0025 0.0218 0.0017 −0.0130∗
(0.0010) (0.0072) (0.0185) (0.0170) (0.0010) (0.0073)
Intra{3,4} 0.0029
∗∗∗ −0.0036 −0.0210 0.0087 0.0002 −0.0138
(0.0010) (0.0102) (0.0188) (0.0231) (0.0014) (0.0104)
Intra{5+} 0.0039
∗∗∗ 0.0007 0.0017 0.0218 0.0022∗ −0.0228∗
(0.0013) (0.0106) (0.0245) (0.0235) (0.0011) (0.0117)
Inter{1,2} 0.0022
∗∗ 0.0004 −0.0062 0.0229 0.0010 −0.0083
(0.0010) (0.0076) (0.0172) (0.0137) (0.0014) (0.0119)
Inter{3,4} 0.0024
∗∗ 0.0003 0.0065 0.0225 0.0011 −0.0087
(0.0011) (0.0091) (0.0202) (0.0265) (0.0017) (0.0111)
Inter{5+} 0.0012 0.0214 0.0066 0.0070 0.0029 0.0061
(0.0014) (0.0127) (0.0203) (0.0214) (0.0021) (0.0154)
Obs. 448,493 48,789 23,222 22,352 453,169 53,538
Notes: Regressions include all fixed effects, time trends, and controls as specified in equation (3), and are
weighted by the CPS weights. Numbers in parentheses are the robust standard errors clustered at the state
level, and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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start with substantially lower level of capital than white-owned firms. They also show that
the white/non-white disparity in start-up capital is the major factor to racial disparities in
closure rates and profits.
Finally, we explore heterogeneity across different age groups, and the results are reported
in Table 3.9. We define young as individuals who are less than forty years old, the rest as
old. The reforms had positive and significant effects on the entry of non-business owners
into incorporated self-employment, although effects were somewhat stronger for the old. The
deeregulation increased incorporation among previously unincorporated young, but had no
impact on the corresponding old. The impact on the exit from the incorporated is different
across these groups. The reforms had a positive and significant effects on the exit rate of the
young incorporated self-employed, but had no appreciably significant effect on that among
those who are old. The intuition behind these findings is similar to that for whites versus
minorities. For life-cycle reasons, the young will be generally less wealthy, and thus less able
to sustain unproductive businesses.
3.5 Conclusion
Why people engage in entrepreneurship is a puzzle for researchers. Entrepreneurship is a
risky activity with low expected return, and only a small number of people choose to engage
in entrepreneurship. Researchers have argued that access to credit is a major factor that can
explain low rates of entrepreneurship. This chapter assesses if there is a causal link between
credit and entrepreneurship. We focus on the effects of a major change in financial policy,
the ability of banks to own and operate multiple branches in multiple jurisdictions in the
US. Using the micro-level data from the Current Population Surveys (CPS) over the 1980–
2007 period, we investigated how branching reforms affected entrepreneurship at individual
owner-level.
Our analysis yields several interesting findings. First, changes in credit affects en-
trepreneurship. We find that entry and exit rates of the incorporated self-employed increased
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after bank expansions. Second, we find that branching reforms encouraged unincorporated
self-employed individuals to incorporate. Finally, the effects of banking deregulation are dif-
ferent across groups. Particularly, we find stronger effects on incorporated business creation
among minorities, and higher exit rates among the young and minorities –two groups likely
to face binding credit constraints.
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Chapter 4. The Impact of Bankruptcy on Entrepreneurship
4.1 Introduction
In financial markets a common market imperfection is that credit arrangements suffer from
problems of limited enforcement. Creditors may lend to borrowers who are not fully willing
or able to repay debts. Borrowers may enter into credit contracts they are not fully able
to repay, due to unexpected negative economic outcomes. Bankruptcy is a legal process
through which borrowers that have defaulted on debt, either restructure or default on existing
credit agreements. Consequently these policies seek to influence the degree to which limited
enforcement problems occur.
The strength and weakness of bankruptcy laws themselves can alter the nature of credit
frictions, which in turn effects households and firms. These policies may have significant im-
plications for the rates of entrepreneurship in an economy. Lenient bankruptcy procedures
may create moral hazard, and encourages borrowers to default on debt contracts. Adverse
selection in these markets may then lead to a reduction in the availability of credit, which
is of significant concern to entrepreneurs. For example, Berkowitz and White (2004) show
that U.S. states with higher bankruptcy exemptions have higher interest rates and loan de-
nial rates for small businesses. Credit access remains a central challenge for many small
businesses. A recent survey conducted by Federal Reserve suggests that nearly a third of
the self-employed firms report credit access as their main financial challenge, irrespective of
the firm’s revenue. However, when there is a high degree uncertainty about future economic
status, a lenient bankruptcy policy creates risk sharing between borrowers and lenders. En-
trepreneurship is a risky economic activity, where BLS reports that nearly forty percent of
new U.S. establishments do not survive four years of continuous operation. Fan and White
(2003) show that there is more entrepreneurship in states with higher bankruptcy exemptions
due to partial wealth insurance.
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In this chapter, we study how a major change in the U.S. Bankruptcy code has effected
small business entrepreneurship. we study how Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protecion Act, dubbed BAPCA, has impacted the self-employed. This policy strengthened
the bankruptcy code in favor of creditors and increased the costs of credit default for borrow-
ers. A main difference between the analysis here and existing studies, such as Paik (2013),
is that we consider an individual entrepreneur’s need for financing based on their particular
industry. We use the March U.S. Current Population Survey and classify the self-employed
according to their two digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code. We then match
these codes a to a common measure of external finance first proposed by Rajan and Zingales
(1998). We then explore how BAPCA effected entry and exit rates into self-employment,
based on their industry’s need for external financing. We further exploit the rich nature of
CPS data to explore the effects of BAPCA on sub-samples based on race, gender or age.
The major finding of this chapter is that the passage of BAPCA seems to have decreased
entry rates to unincorporated entrepreneurship. Incorporated businesses are protected by
limited liability, which separates a firm’s financial assets from its owners. Consequently,
incorporation provides the self-employed with a degree of partial wealth insurance. This
suggests that BAPCA, which reduced the degree of risk sharing between borrowers and
lenders had pronounced effects, with fewer financial protections in the event of a default.
This is further supported by evidence that BAPCA’s effects were strongest in states which of-
fer lower degree of bankruptcy exemptions. Finally, in states which offer greater bankruptcy
protections, BAPCA led to a reduction in the entry rate among mostly self-employed indi-
viduals who were in industries with a greater need for financing.
This chapter relates to multiple areas of literature. The first focuses on the determinants
of entrepreneurship. This literature seeks to understand what drives individuals to enter
into entrepreneurship given its risky nature, and has been covered in detail in the previous
chapter (Sarker and Unel, 2017). This study relates most closely to literature that seeks
to understand whether credit is a key determinant, where Buera (2015) provides a recent
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survey.
This chapter is also related to an emerging literature on BAPCA. A number of works have
studied the impacts of this policy on household credit default rates, especially in mortgage
markets, which had implications for the 2009 financial crisis (Li et al. 2011, Mitman 2016).
The present work relates to Paik (2013), who treats BAPCA as a one time shock and studies
entry rates into self-employment. Using logistic regression, he finds that BAPCA encouraged
unincorporated firms to incorporate. The present study differs in a number of key aspects.
We consider how BAPCA effects entrepreneurship based on an individual’s need for
credit. We classify the self-employed into SIC industry categories in order to consider a
particular industry’s need for external finance. We then study both entry and exit rates.
Furthermore, we consider how the degree of bankruptcy protection offered across different
states influence the impact of the policy. Last, we explore how BAPCA impacted different
subgroups of the population. We consider the effects of the reform on people of different
races, gender and age.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews bankruptcy
policy in the US and summarizes the changes to the code made by BAPCA. Section 3
discusses the data used in this chapter and construction of key variables. Section 4 describes
the econometric methodology employed in this chapter. Section 5 presents the results of this
analysis, and section 6 concludes.
4.2 Background on Bankruptcy Reform in the U.S.
In the U.S., if an individual declares bankruptcy he or she can file for one of two personal
bankruptcy procedures, either chapter 7 or chapter 13. When either type of bankruptcy
is filed, creditors are required to stop collecting debt. Under a chapter 7 procedure, an
individual surrenders their non-exempt 1 assets to a trustee, their debts are discharged, and
future earnings are protected from collection. The trustee liquidates surrendered assets and
1Individual states can exempt certain types of financial assets from bankruptcy. Most states exempt a
portion of home-equity which is discussed later in the chapter.
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repays creditors. In a chapter 13 bankruptcy procedure, individuals are not obligated to
surrender financial assets and instead are required to repay a portion of their debt from
future earnings over a span of three to five years. Individuals are required to propose a plan
which offers repayment equivalent to what they would pay under a chapter 7 procedure and
their remaining debts are only discharged if they repay debts. (see Fay et al. 2002,Berkowitz
and White 2004, Paik 2013).
Because a chapter 7 bankruptcy protects future earnings and discharges debts, it is
referred to as a ‘fresh start’. Individuals typically filing for bankruptcy have greater incentive
to select this type of bankruptcy procedure, unless they have significant amounts of financial
assets. Indeed, approximately 70% of bankruptcies are chapter 7 bankruptcies and 95% of
filers have no non-exempt assets to surrender for repayment to the credit (Paik 2013).
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, was a major
policy reform of the existing U.S. bankruptcy code. It introduced three major changes to
the code. First, it placed income restrictions on individuals wishing to file for chapter 7
bankruptcy. Second, it lengthened the time which a debtor must wait before filing for a
successive bankruptcy. Third, it placed geographic restrictions on exemptions debtors can
use in a chapter 7 bankruptcy procedure in the cases where a debtor recently moved to
another state.
The new policy introduced income restrictions by requiring that debtors pass a series of
complex means test which are designed to prevent high income borrowers from filing for a
chapter 7 bankruptcy. These tests are effectively used to demonstrate that their average,
size adjusted, family income for six months preceding the filing is below their state’s median
monthly family income level (Paik 2013). If debtors failed the means test, their case is either
dismissed or converted to a chapter 13 reorganization plan with the debtors consent.
BAPCA also increased the length of time which a debtor must wait before they are
eligible to file for another bankruptcy. Under the new law, a debtor who has filed for a
chapter 7 bankruptcy must wait 8 years, rather than 6 years, before filing for a second
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chapter 7 bankruptcy. Furthermore, the debtor must wait 4 years before filing a chapter 13
bankruptcy, whereas prior to the reform they could file almost immediately. Debtors who
have filed for a chapter 13 bankruptcy must wait at least 2 years before they are eligible
to file for another chapter 13 bankruptcy; prior to the reform they only needed to wait 6
months.
As stated previously, a chapter 7 bankruptcy requires that a debtor surrenders his/her
assets above an exemption level, the largest of which are home equity exemptions, called
homestead exemptions. Here home equity refers to the fair market value of a property minus
outstanding mortgage debt. The homestead is considered the primary residence of a person.
If the value of home equity is below a state’s exemption level, creditors cannot force the
sale of a house. The size of the exemption varies widely, with some states offering virtually
unlimited exemption levels.
This makes it attractive for debtors to move their primary residence to high-exemption
states in order to protect their assets. The new policy reform introduced rules to discourage
this behavior. If a debtor who is filing for chapter 7 bankruptcy moved their primary
residence between different states within a two year period of their filing date, they are
ineligible to use their current state of residence’s homestead exemption. Instead, the debtor
would use the exemption from whichever domicile they resided the longest for over a 6
month (180 day) period prior to two years before their filing date. The reform also set
a maximum exemption for properties owned for less than three years and four months to
125,000$ irrespective of an individual’s states homestead exemption level2.
4.3 Data
The data used for this chapter is drawn from the March Current Population Survey covering
the period from 2003–2008. Entrepreneurial activity is measured by changes in employment
status to or from self-employment at the individual level. The CPS is a monthly cross-
2This threshold is lifted periodically by a Judicial Conference of the United States. As of 2010 the value
is 146,450$
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sectional survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau and is used to construct labor force
statistics such as the unemployment rate. The March supplement is an annual survey which
contains additional information about household demographics and economic conditions for
both the current time period and the previous calendar year. We exploit this feature to
identify individuals who either enter or exit from business ownership.
Within the CPS files workers are classified as working for either private sector, public
sector, non-profit or as self-employed. We classify entering entrepreneurs as individuals
who report that they are currently self-employed, whereas in the previous year they were
private-sector (wage & salary) workers. Similarly, exiting entrepreneurs are those who report
that they are currently private sector (wage & salary) workers, but were self-employed the
previous calendar year. The self-employed workers are further classified into two categories:
incorporated and unincorporated. This analysis will treat these groups as distinct, but also
consider the effects of policy on all self-employed workers. A large number of academic studies
have used all self-employed workers as a proxy for entrepreneurship (Borjas and Bronars 1989,
Evans and Leighton 1989, Hamilton 2000 and others). However, a recent study by Levine and
Rubinstein (2017) highlights that there are differences between incorporated self-employed
workers and those who run unincorporated businesses. The incorporated self-employed are
generally more educated, work longer hours and earn more per hour than traditional wage
workers and unincorporated workers.
The sample considers all workers in the labor force (18-64 years old), and similar to
the previous chapter, excludes those with imputed/missing worker class and inconsistent
reports. We also exclude individuals who work in public administration sector since almost
no entrepreneurial activity takes place in this sector. The sample contains information about
each individual’s age, gender, race, education level, marital status and industry worked. We
reclassify industries according to two-digit SIC (Standard Industry Classification) codes.
Table 4.1 reports summary statistics for self-employed and wage & salary workers. Com-
pared to wage & salary workers, a higher proportion of self-employed individuals are male,
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics on Self-employed and Wage Workers, 2002-2008
Self-employed Salary
All Incorporated Unincorporated Workers
Female (%) 37.1 28.2 39.5 49.2
(47.8) (45.0) (48.7) (49.9)
Age 44.6 45.5 44.3 39.9
(10.0) (9.4) (7.9) (11.3)
White (%) 86.7 88.1 86.9 80.8
(33.11) (32.3) (34.4) (39.4)
Some College (%) 63.8 72.6 58.5 58.1
(48.2) (44.5) (49.3) (49.3)
Sample Size 53,966 19,045 34,921 440,268
Notes: The data draw on the March CPS Files from Ipums (2017). Some College represents individuals who
have at least some college education. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations, and the CPS weights
are used in all calculations.
white and more educated. Notice that the percentage of individuals who have at least some
college education is quite comparable between unincorporated and traditional workers. In
contrast, the incorporated self-employed workers are significantly more educated. In Table
4.2, we report entry (exit) rates into (from) both categories of entrepreneurship. Notice that
there is a higher entry rate into unincorporated self-employment group than the incorporated
group. Women are also less likely to start incorporated businesses. Finally, the incorporated
self-employed have higher exit rates, than the unincorporated self employed.
Data on external finance is taken from Duygan-Bump et al. (2015). They calculate
measures of external finance following an approach outlined in Rajan and Zingales (1998)
and Ceterolli and Strahan (2006). Using the Compustat Database they identify firms which
appear in the database for at least 10 years. They then calculate a measure of external
finance which is the proportion of capital expenditures financed by external finance. For
each firm they calculate a measure of free cash flow which is equal to the total capital
expenditure (Compustat Item 128) minus the cash flow from operations (Compustat Item
110) summed over the 1980 to 2006 period. They divide this by the total capital expenditure.
They then take the median value for each industry, categorized according to the two-digit
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Table 4.2 Entrepreneurial Activity at Individual-Owner Level, 2002-2008
Entry Rate (%) Exit Rate (%)
Incorp. Unincorp. Incorp. Unincorp.
All Sample .59 .79 8.3 3.2
(7.6) (8.9) (27.7) (17.8)
Female .40 .83 8.9 3.5
(6.3) (9.1) (28.5) (18.4)
White .62 .82 8.0 3.2
(7.8) (9.0) (27.2) (17.7)
Some College .71 .84 7.6 3.1
(8.4) (9.1) (26.6) (17.5)
Notes: The data draw on the March CPS Files from Ipums (2017). Some College represents individuals who
have at least some college education. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations, and the CPS weights
are used in all calculations.
SIC code. Note that negative values indicate that firms have free cash flow and are not
heavily dependent on external finance.
As a robustness check, we construct an alternative measure which is also considered in
Ceterolli and Strahan (2006). We use data from the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finance
(SSBF), which was conducted by the Federal Reserve. This is a nationally representative
sample of small firms, defined as firms with fewer than 500 employees. For each two-digit
SIC category, we take the loans to asset ratio for the firm at the median of the distribution.
Loans here are mostly from commercial banks, credit unions and other thrifts. This measure
captures bank dependence by smaller firms, as COMPUSTAT data reflects only large publicly
traded firms. For consistency, we consider industry categories that are included in both data
sets. As a result, the analysis here excludes forestry, fishing, tobacco, rail, oil pipelines,
insurance and security brokerage. These industries consist mostly of larger firms and are
unlikely to meaningfully alter the results, which focuses on the self-employed. Furthermore,
Table 4.1 shows that some of these industries (e.g. forestry or insurance) have extremely
large values of free cash flow, which can lead to confusing results. When these industry
categories are omitted, the correlation between the two different measures is 50 percent.
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4.3.1 Homestead Exemption
In bankruptcy proceedings, homestead exemptions are the amounts of equity that home-
owners can keep if they declare bankruptcy. This exemption represents the largest portion
of financial assets which are protected when a individual declares a chapter 7 bankruptcy
(Fan and White, 2003). The exemptions are determined at a state level, and the amount of
equity that homeowners can exempt vary widely from state to state. For example, Florida
offers a unlimited exemption, while Maryland offers no exemption. Furthermore, exemption
levels may vary based on marital status, the number of children, and a person’s age. Since
the CPS identifies these characteristics, we construct a variable that identifies the homestead
exemption level for each individual within our sample 3. Data on homestead exemption level
for each case prior to the passage of BAPCA is taken from Elias (2009). Note that a portion
of BAPCA reform limited the homestead exemption in most circumstances to 125,000$, so
we use this value for states with exemption levels higher than 125,000$ once the reform is in
effect.
4.4 Econometric Specification
We use the following linear probability model to investigate the effects of BAPCA on en-
trepreneurship:
Yisjt = α + βBapcat + δBapcat × EFDj + HSist + γXist + ηj + εisjt, (4.1)
where Y measures either entry or exit of entrepreneurs at individual level as in the previous
chapter. Bapcat is a dummy variable that identifies if the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 is in effect in year t. The dummy variable equals zero up
to the year the law is introduced, and one afterward. EFD is a measure of external finance
dependence in industry j, and HS denotes homestead exemption in state s for individual i.
Our coefficient of interest is β.
3Note that we report values in millions of dollars. This is to avoid overly small point estimates. A value
of .125 would correspond to 125,000 $.
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As in Chapter 2, Xist is the set of observed covariates including dummies for gender,
marital status, race, education, and a quadratic for age. State and industry fixed effects (ηs
and ηj) are included to control for any time invariant state- and industry-specific factors that
can affect entrepreneurship. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the state
level are used to mitigate the potential serial correlation in the error term. All regressions
are weighted by the CPS individual-level weights.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Benchmark
Table 4.3 reports the effects of the bankruptcy reform on the entry and exit of incorporated,
unincorporated and all self-employed, based on the regression specification. Regression in-
cludes all controls, state fixed effects, industry fixed effects and is weighted according to
CPS weights. Column 2 reports that after the passage of BAPCA there is a decline in the
probability that a traditional worker (i.e. wage and salary worker) enters into unincorpo-
rated entrepreneurship, which is statistically significant at the one percent level. Since the
entry rate into unincorporated entrepreneurship is 0.79 percent, the coefficient estimate of
-.00101 reflects a 12 percent decline in the entry rate. Note that column 2 also shows that
BAPCA led to a relatively higher decline for firms with greater needs for external finance,
but this effect is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The results indicate
that BAPCA did not have an economically meaningful impact on exit rates of any category
of self-employed workers, and no effect on the entry of incorporated workers.
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Table 4.2 Impact of Bankruptcy Reform (2003–2008)
Entry Exit from All
Incorporated Uninc. Incorporated Uninc. Entry Exit
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Bapca −0.00009 −0.00101∗∗∗ −0.00715 0.00192 −0.00108∗ −0.00079
(0.00039) (0.00034) (0.00517) (0.00237) (0.00060) (0.00235)
Bapca × EFD −0.00022 −0.00094∗ 0.01610 −0.00195 −0.00113 0.00529
(0.00104) (0.000508) (0.0122) (0.00709) (0.00111) (0.00672)
Age 0.00035∗∗∗ 0.00011 −0.00206 −0.00374∗∗∗ 0.00045∗∗∗ −0.00244∗∗∗
(0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00224 (0.00091) (0.000140) (0.00091)
Age2 −0.00000∗ −0.00001 0.00001 0.00003∗∗∗ −0.00001∗∗ 0.000013
(0.000001) (0.00000) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Female −0.00316∗∗∗ −0.00005 −0.00251 0.00249 −0.00317∗∗∗ −0.00580
(0.000435) (0.00026) (0.00753) (0.00332) (0.00048) (0.00400)
1em] Marital status 0.00254∗∗∗ 0.00042 −0.00806 −0.0120∗∗∗ 0.00292∗∗∗ −0.00469
(0.00034) (0.00026) (0.00688) (0.00217) (0.000398) (0.00293)
HS −0.00025 −0.00016 −0.00614 −0.00188 −0.00041 −0.00373∗∗
(0.00035) (0.00023) (0.00459) (0.00124) (0.00039) (0.00153)
Obs. 419,676 419,665 17,783 32,049 421,834 49,915
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the state level, and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively. Controls not reported for brevity.
This result makes sense, as corporations have limited liability which separates a firm’s debt
from its owner. Thus the incorporated self-employed are somewhat shielded against creditors
in the event of a business failure.
Table 4.4 Impact of Bankruptcy Reform, by Homestead Exemption (2003–2008)
Entry Exit from All
Incorporated Uninc. Incorporated Uninc. Entry Exit
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel A. Below Median Level
Bapca −0.000076 −0.00124∗∗∗ −0.01340∗∗ 0.00110 −0.00130∗∗ −0.00434
(0.00032) (0.00032) (0.00614) (0.00382) (0.00049) (0.00311)
Bapca × EFD 0.00034 −0.00014 0.02680 0.00069 0.00021 0.01170
(0.00083) (0.00079) (0.02110) (0.00893) (0.00113) (0.00945)
Obs. 213,782 213,908 8,278 14,996 214,848 23,315
Panel B. Above Median Level
Bapca −0.00017 −0.00065 0.00160 0.00335 −0.00080 0.00398
(0.000922) (0.000621) (0.00776) (0.00282) (0.00123) (0.00342)
Bapca × EFD −0.000875 −0.00191∗∗∗ 0.00463 −0.00574 −0.00274 −0.00196
(0.00204) (0.000564) (0.0129) (0.0111) (0.00197) (0.00694)
Obs. 203,376 203,235 9,414 16,869 204,456 26,324
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the state level, and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Controls not reported for brevity.
Table 4.4 reports the impact of policy based on a states homestead exemption level.
As stated previously, the homestead exemption reflects the degree an individual’s home-
equity is protected from bankruptcy. Individuals who reside in states with high exemptions
can potentially shield themselves from a loss of financial assets by investing into their home-
equity and avoid some of the costs associated with bankruptcy. Thus the effect of bankruptcy
reform could potentially be different depending on the exemption level an individual faces.
In order to investigate this issue we examine how the policy reform affected entrepreneurship
based on whether an individual faces a high or a low exemption level. Here we divide the
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sample based on the median exemption level prior to the passage of BAPCA. States with
higher exemption levels offer a greater degree of bankruptcy protection against creditors,
which reflects a more lenient credit enforcement regime.
Here, the top panel reports the estimates for states with lower exemption levels. Column
2 shows that the effects of BAPCA on the unincorporated are concentrated in states with a
lower degree of homestead protection. This suggests that strengthening of the bankruptcy
code had a larger negative effect on entrepreneurship in states that offer less bankruptcy
protection. Note that this effect is large enough to drive a decline in the overall entry rate
into self-employment as reported in column 5.
Another striking result is that in these states BAPCA seems also to have led to a decline
in the exit rate from incorporated business ownership. The coefficient estimate of -.01340
suggests that BAPCA has led to a 16 percent decline in the exit rate. Because corporations
are protected by limited liability, the incorporated self-employed are offered a higher level
of protection when entering a credit contract. In states with relatively weak homestead
exemption, a further tightening of personal bankruptcy procedures have increased incentives
for the incorporated self-employed to maintain their incorporated status.
The bottom panel of the table reports the effects on states with higher exemption levels.
The direct effect of the reform on both entry and exit rates are statistically insignificant.
However, column 2 suggests that BAPCA reduced the rate of entry into unincorporated
entrepreneurship in industries with relatively higher needs of external finance. This implies
that in states with lenient credit enforcement policies, a national tightening of the bankruptcy
code lead to a reduction in entrepreneurship in sectors which are more likely to require
external borrowing. This is consistent with the idea that a reduction in risk sharing due to
the change in the policy leads to less entrepreneurship.
4.5.2 Effects by Race, Gender and Age
Several studies have documented that credit access, that is the ability to enter into credit
contracts, differs greatly depending on age, race and gender (Fairlie and Robb, 2008). In
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one example, Asiedu et al. (2012) show that the denial rates of loan applications is about 30
percent higher for minority-owned firms compared to white males. In the previous chapter
of this dissertation (Sarker and Unel, 2019) it was shown that credit supply increases due to
banking deregulation have stronger effects on entrepreneurship rates among young workers
and minorities. Thus bankruptcy policy which alters the nature of credit contracts may have
different effects on different segments of the population.
Table 4.5 Impact of Bankruptcy Reform by Race (2003–2008)
Entry Exit from All
Incorporated Uninc. Incorporated Uninc. Entry Exit
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel A. Whites
Bapca −0.00017 −0.00110∗∗∗ −0.00614 0.00161 −0.00128∗∗ −0.00062
(0.00041) (0.00035) (0.00569) (0.00284) (0.00062) (0.00259)
Bapca × EFD −0.00046 −0.00088 0.01350 0.00229 −0.00132 0.00630
(0.00119) (0.00068) (0.01250) (0.00668) (0.00122) (0.00631)
Obs. 341,773 341,760 15,723 27,697 43,491 26,324
Panel B. Non-whites
Bapca 0.00018 −0.00039 −0.01800 0.00321 −0.00021 −0.00026
(0.00070) (0.000542) (0.01280) (0.00468) (0.00079) (0.00531)
Bapca × EFD 0.00114 −0.00113 0.03660 −0.03690∗ 0.00001 −0.00652
(0.00118) (0.00127) (0.05320) (0.01950) (0.00169) (0.02150)
Obs. 77,903 77,905 2,060 4,352 4,352 6,424
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the state level, and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Controls not reported for brevity.
To explore this possibility we exploit the rich nature of the CPS. In Table 4.5, we study
how BAPCA effects entrepreneurship based on an individual’s race. Panel A. of the table
shows the effects on whites. Column 2, reports that their is a decline in the entry rate
into unincorporated entrepreneurship. This result is consistent with the previous table, but
suggests BAPCA mostly impacted Whites. There appears to be no real impact from the
policy on the entry and exit rates into entrepreneurship of minority workers. This finding is
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Table 4.6 Impact of Bankruptcy Reform by Sex (2003–2008)
Entry Exit from All
Incorporated Uninc. Incorporated Uninc. Entry Exit
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel A. Males
Bapca −0.00050 −0.00113∗∗ −0.00648 −0.000733 −0.00159∗∗ −0.00442
(0.00050) (0.00043) (0.00683) (0.00317) (0.000692) (0.00388)
Bapca × EFD −0.000002 −0.00097 0.01750 0.00593 −0.00096 0.01660∗
(0.00157) (0.00095) (0.0153) (0.01000) (0.00203) (0.00938)
Obs. 214,797 214,447 12,898 18,890 215,980 31,838
Panel B. Female
Bapca 0.00035 −0.00089∗ −0.00369 0.00247 −0.00054 0.00128
(0.00033) (0.00046) (0.00863) (0.00296) (0.00060) (0.00263)
Bapca × EFD −0.00009 −0.00084 0.00652 −0.00712 −0.00091 −0.00702
(0.00072) (0.00083) (0.02710) (0.01540) (0.00096) (0.01410)
Obs. 204,879 205,218 4,885 13,159 205,854 18,077
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the state level, and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Controls not reported for brevity.
by and large consistent with documented facts about minorities. Blacks, the second, largest
minority group, have significantly lower access to startup capital and loans. Consequently,
black entrepreneurship is less likely to be effected by changes in bankruptcy policy.
Table 4.6 explores the effect of the reform based on Gender. The top panel reports
results for males and the bottom panel for females. Consistent with the benchmark result,
bankruptcy reform only has an effect on the entry rate into unincorporated self-employment.
This effect is stronger for male workers with a coefficient that is statistically significant at the
5 percent level. For females the coefficient estimate of -.00089 is smaller than the benchmark,
and the effect is statistically significant only at the 10 percent level. However, this reflects a
10.8 percent decline in the entry rate (.82 percent) for females.
Table 4.6 reports the effects of the reforms based on Age. We divide the sample of
workers into two groups. Workers under the age of forty are categorized as young. Those
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older than forty are classified as old. The top panel reports the effects of reform on young
worker. The results indicate that BAPCA mostly effected the entry rate of young workers
into unincorporated business ownership. Consistent with the benchmark estimates the
Table 4.7 Impact of Bankruptcy Reform by Age (2003–2008)
Entry Exit from All
Incorporated Uninc. Incorporated Uninc. Entry Exit
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel A. Young (Age < 40)
Bapca 0.00011 −0.00131∗∗∗ −0.0147 0.00224 −0.00118∗ −0.00212
(0.00035) (0.00043) (0.0131) (0.00575) (0.000644) (0.00530)
Bapca × EFD −0.00013 −0.00110 0.0389 −0.00494 −0.00121 0.00740
(0.00082) (0.00095) (0.02360) (0.01530) (0.00121) (0.01300)
Obs. 200,788 201,155 4,739 10,415 201,887 15,186
Panel B. Old (Age > 40)
Bapca −0.00043 −0.00067 −0.00796 0.00133 −0.00108 −0.00158
(0.00054) (0.00047) (0.0061) (0.0023) (0.00073) (0.00289)
Bapca × EFD −0.00109 −0.00083 0.01340 −0.000485 −0.00189 0.00538
(0.00172) (0.00091) (0.0145) (0.00641) (0.00158) (0.00724)
Obs. 206,142 205,777 12,435 20,585 207,129 33,066
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the state level, and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Controls not reported for brevity.
policy has no effect on exit rates or entry rate into incorporated entrepreneurship. The
bottom panel shows the effects of BAPCA on older workers, the policy appears to have no
effect on either entry or exit rates among this group.
4.6 Conclusion
High rates of entrepreneurship are seen as a sign of economic progress because of its effects
on competition, innovation, employment and economic growth. However, at the individual
level entrepreneurship remains a risky activity, subsequently credit default becomes a means
of insurance in the event of poor economic outcomes. The bankruptcy code is a legal proce-
dure through which credit defaults occur or credit contracts are restructured. Consequently,
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the strictness or leniency of these laws impact the degree of risk sharing between borrow-
ers and lenders in risky entrepreneurial projects. In this chapter we have studied how a
change in the bankruptcy code, one which reduces the ability of borrowers to default, effects
entrepreneurship.
The analysis presented in this chapter suggests that BAPCA reduced the likelihood that
individuals start unincorporated businesses. As the unincorporated self-employed are not
protected by limited liability, the tightening of the bankruptcy code results in a decline
risk sharing for this group. The estimates here show that in the U.S., states which offer
a greater degree of protection for the borrower’s assets through homestead exemptions,
the tightening of the bankruptcy code appears to have a greater impact on self-employed
businesses with relatively higher needs for external borrowing. Finally, in the states with
lower homestead exemptions, there seems to be a reduction in the exit rates of incorporated
businesses. This suggests that in states in which BAPCA has a larger negative impact on
borrowers, individuals are more likely to maintain incorporation status as a form of insurance.
Incorporation separates a firm’s assets from the owner’s assets, thus offers a greater degree
of financial protection in the event of a credit default.
70
Appendix. Supplementary Tables for Chapter 3
Table A.1. Impact of Bank Deregulations on Entrepreneurship, 1980–1993
Incorporated
Entry from Exit to Unincorporated
Variable Non-Bus. Uninc. Non-Bus. Uninc. Entry Exit
Intra −0.0000 0.0065 0.0301∗ 0.0551∗∗∗ 0.0009 0.0029
(0.0007) (0.0086) (0.0161) (0.0129) (0.0014) (0.0096)
Inter 0.0027∗∗∗ 0.0044 −0.0015 0.0390∗∗ 0.0001 0.0011
(0.0007) (0.0076) (0.0153) (0.0175) (0.0011) (0.0072)
Obs. 472,413 49,059 17,006 17,357 479,461 54,055
Notes: All regressions include all fixed effects and controls specified in equation (3); and regressions are
weighted by the CPS weights. Numbers in parentheses are the robust standard errors clustered at the state
level, and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table A.2. Impact of Bank Deregulations on Entrepreneurship (1980–2007), by Gender
Incorporated
Entry from Exit to Unincorporated
Variable Non-Bus. Uninc. Non-Bus. Uninc. Entry Exit
Panel A. Females
Intra 0.0004 −0.0062 −0.0014 −0.0002 −0.0004 −0.0020
(0.0004) (0.0080) (0.0249) (0.0324) (0.0012) (0.0125)
Inter 0.0012∗∗ 0.0040 −0.0086 0.0658∗ −0.0010 0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0066) (0.0360) (0.0378) (0.0016) (0.0145)
Obs. 445,537 26,168 8,319 7,329 450,977 32,371
Panel B. Males
Intra 0.0010 0.0046 0.0110 0.0197∗ 0.0013 −0.0029
(0.0008) (0.0062) (0.0115) (0.0111) (0.0013) (0.0083)
Inter 0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0039 0.0086 0.0332∗∗ −0.0004 −0.0019
(0.0011) (0.0062) (0.0156) (0.0135) (0.0012) (0.0070)
Obs. 484,628 58,012 27,755 27,061 490,836 62,659
Notes: All regressions include all fixed effects and controls specified in equation (3); and regressions are weighted by the CPS weights. Numbers in
parentheses are the robust standard errors clustered at the state level, and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
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Table A.3. Impact of Bank Deregulations on Entrepreneurship (1980–2007), by Race
Incorporated
Entry from Exit to Unincorporated
Variable Non-Bus. Uninc. Non-Bus. Uninc. Entry Exit
Panel A. Non-whites
Intra 0.0003 0.0237 0.1534∗ 0.0132 −0.0037∗ 0.0782∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0277) (0.0776) (0.0600) (0.0021) (0.0320)
Inter 0.0037∗∗∗ −0.0329 0.1227∗ −0.0026 0.0035 0.0520∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0248) (0.0612) (0.0765) (0.0022) (0.0254)
Obs. 117,595 5,179 2,121 1,973 118,891 6,321
Panel B. Whites
Intra 0.0008 −0.0003 0.0058 0.0158 0.0011 −0.0081
(0.0006) (0.0054) (0.0105) (0.0118) (0.0011) (0.0067)
Inter 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0061 0.0021 0.0435∗∗∗ −0.0015 −0.0054
(0.0008) (0.0053) (0.0131) (0.0136) (0.0012) (0.0061)
Obs. 812,570 79,001 33,953 32,417 822,922 88,709
Notes: All regressions include all fixed effects and controls specified in equation (3); and regressions are weighted by the CPS weights. Numbers in
parentheses are the robust standard errors clustered at the state level, and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
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Table A.4. Impact of Bank Deregulations on Entrepreneurship (1980–2007), by Age
Incorporated
Entry from Exit to Unincorporated
Variable Non-Bus. Uninc. Non-Bus. Uninc. Entry Exit
Panel A. Young (Age < 40)
Intra −0.0007 0.0044 0.0375 0.0227 0.0000 0.0091
(0.0008) (0.0063) (0.0258) (0.0245) (0.0016) (0.0096)
Inter 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0079 0.0216 0.0664∗∗∗ −0.0020 0.0043
(0.0007) (0.0072) (0.0192) (0.0243) (0.0012) (0.0097)
Obs. 447,994 32,193 11,432 10,688 454,541 37,907
Panel B. Old (Age > 40)
Intra 0.0027∗∗∗ −0.0021 −0.0066 0.0161 0.0011 −0.0140∗
(0.0008) (0.0073) (0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0010) (0.0070)
Inter 0.0024∗∗ −0.0003 −0.0025 0.0244 0.0010 −0.0101
(0.0009) (0.0071) (0.0170) (0.0157) (0.0013) (0.0100)
Obs. 482,171 51,987 24,642 23,702 487,272 57,123
Notes: All regressions include all fixed effects and controls specified in equation (3); and regressions are weighted by the CPS weights. Numbers in
parentheses are the robust standard errors clustered at the state level, and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
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